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BACK TO BASICS: A CALL TO REEVALUATE THE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE DISQUALIFICATION FOR
MISCONDUCT
BY LISA LAWLER GRADITOR*

Over the past five years, the unemployment insurance
(hereinafter "UI") system has attracted increasing attention
among American policy makers and worker advocates-and for
good reason. In 1999, the national unemployment recipiency rate
(the number of insured unemployed workers, or those claiming
unemployment benefits, compared to the total population of
unemployed

workers

seeking employment) slumped

to 37%.'

Recipiency rates for low-wage workers were even lower, standing
at only 18% during the mid-1990's.2 Such low rates of recipiency
trigger alarm because the UI system is supposed to function as an
insurance policy for both the nation and individual workers,
insuring workers against the loss of employment and protecting

* Staff Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago. B.A.
1997, Goucher College; J.D. 2000, University of California Hastings College of
Law. This article was made possible by funding from the Woods Fund of
Chicago. On behalf of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan
Chicago, the author would like to thank the Woods Fund for its generous
support for our advocacy efforts to improve the Illinois Unemployment
Insurance Program, efforts which address our mutual goals of enabling work
and reducing poverty. The author would also like to thank Timothy Huizenga
and Diana White for their ongoing support and contributions to this article.
1. See U.S. GEN'L ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-181, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
ROLE AS SAFETY NET FOR LoW-WAGE WORKERS Is LIMITED 10 (2000)
[hereinafter SAFETY NET] (noting that in the last fifty years the overall
percentage of unemployed people who apply for benefits under the UI program
has declined due to reduction in manufacturing, union membership and
tighter state eligibility criteria). For discussion of recipiency trends from 1980
to 1990, see generally U.S. GEN'L ACCT. OFF., GAO/HRD-93-107,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, PROGRAM'S ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES
JEOPARDIZED (1993) [hereinafter OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED] (finding a 20%
decline in the Ul recipiency rates since the late 1970's); See also Stephen A.
Wandner & Thomas Stengle, Unemployment Insurance: Measuring Who
Receives It, 120 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15 (1997) (describing several competing
methods to measure UI recipiency).
2. See SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that in March 1995, only
18% of unemployed low-wage workers collected unemployment benefits,
compared to 40% of higher wage workers).
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the nation during economic recessions by boosting consumer
spending. Although the factors contributing to falling recipiency
rates are myriad,3 worker advocates point out that a primary
failing of the UI system is that UT "policy" carries too many
antiquated exclusions.4
The American UT system was created in 1935, in large part to
aid workers laid off as a result of the Great Depression.' Despite
large-scale changes in the American economy and historic
demographic shifts in the composition of the labor force, the legal
framework of the UI system has not undergone substantial
revision since its inception. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that
UI rules, designed to reflect the experience of the average worker
in 1935, are no longer meeting the needs of the twenty-first
century labor force. Recent programmatic reviews of the UT
system6 have allowed worker advocates and policy makers to
gather support for a reform agenda to modernize the system.7 The
first item on this agenda is to reform eligibility guidelines, or the
govern what kind of work is covered under the UI
rules that
8
program.
State eligibility rules often exclude large numbers of women

3. See generally DAVID C. WITTENBURG ET AL., LITERATURE REVIEW AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RECIPIENCY RATIOS (The

Lewin Group, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Final Report, 1999) (examining the effects
of several factors on the UI system: decline in unionization, federal taxing of
UI benefits and cost-shifting from state UI programs to other federally funded
programs) available at http://wdr.doleta.gov//owsdrr/99-7/99-7.pdf. For the
influence of race on recipiency, see JEFFREY B. WENGER, DIVIDED WE FALL
(Economic Policy Institute Briefing Papers, 2001), available at
http://www/epinet.org/briefingpapers/divided.html (finding that a 1% decline
in white labor participants and a 1% increase in the share of women workers
resulted in a 1% decline in overall UI recipiency).
4. See WITrENBURG, supra note 3.

5. Id. at 3-4. See Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment
Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 29-34 (1945).
6. See generally OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, supra note 1; SAFETY NET,
supra note 1; See MARC BALDWIN & RICHARD MCHUGH, UNPREPARED FOR
RECESSION: THE EROSION OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE
FOSTERED BY PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 1980S (Economic Policy Institute,

Briefing Paper No. 29, 1993) (finding that restoring the power of UI to pre1980 levels will require increasing workers' access to benefits and increasing
the level of these benefits) at http://www.lights.com/epi/virlib/Briefing
Papers/1992/unpreparedf.PDF (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
7. Wenger, supra note 3, at 15; ANNISAH UM'RAI & VICKY LOVELL,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REFORM FOR THE NEW WORKFORCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE STRATEGY FORUM FOR IMPROVING UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE POLICIES TO BENEFIT WOMEN, LOW-WAGE AND CONTINGENT

WORKERS

(Institute

for

Women's

Policy

Research,

2000);

NATIONAL

EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, PREPARING FOR RECESSION IN THE STATES:
at
(2001)
INSURANCE
SYSTEM
THE
UNEMPLOYMENT
STRENGTHEN

http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/pub9l%2Epdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
8. Wenger, supra note 3, at 16.
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and low-wage workers because they require a person to work fulltime hours in order to be covered.' Even where part-time workers
are not excluded from coverage, they commonly run afoul of state
rules requiring a UI claimant to be available and searching for
full-time work. °
Since two-thirds of working mothers are
employed part-time, women are disproportionately harmed by
these eligibility rules." Additionally, the earnings thresholds that
a worker must meet to qualify for unemployment benefits also
disadvantage part-time workers because states base these
amounts on the reasonable expected earnings of a full-time
worker." High-wage earners, who work less than full-time, may
nonetheless qualify for benefits because their above-average
compensation will make up for fewer working hours. However,
low-wage workers have to work more hours to qualify when these
earning thresholds are stated in dollar amounts; part-time lowwage workers often fail to qualify."3 To the further disadvantage of
low-wage workers, the relevant time period for calculating
qualifying wages-the base period-typically disregards workers'
most recent three to six months of earnings; many low-wage
workers, who have unstable job histories, need their most recent

9. See generally RICK MCHUGH, ET AL., LAID OFF AND LEFT OUT (National
Employment Law Project, Inc., 2002) (suggesting that treating part-time
workers fairly would not place an undue burden on state UI programs),
available at www.nelp.org/docUploads/publl3%2Epdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
10. See generally id. (noting that twenty-nine states require a claimant to
search for full-time work in order to collect unemployment benefits). For the
relevant Illinois provisions, see 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/500 (2000) (setting
forth eligibility requirements for UI benefits); Ill. Reg. 2865.115 (defining the
phrase "actively seeking work"). See also Ill. Reg. 2865.125 (stating that the
UI full-time work requirement is not applicable to claimants who can prove
that only part-time work is available to them).
11. See generally NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WOMEN, LOW
WAGE WORKERS AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM: STATE
LEGISLATIVE MODELS FOR CHANGE (1997) [hereinafter WOMEN, Low WAGE
WORKERS & UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION] (providing a "comprehensive
checklist of state unemployment compensation laws benefiting women and
low-wage workers" to show that "increased state efforts to expand access to
unemployment compensation" is "consistent with the fundamental changes in
the labor market") Id.
at 2-3, available at http'//www.nelp.orgl
docUploads/publ9%2Epdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
12. Illinois has a low earning threshold that is not difficult even for lowwage part-timers to meet. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/437 (2000).
13. Washington State offers one example of how to remedy this obvious
disparity. Instead of using monetary earning thresholds, Washington's basic
requirement is 680 hours of work and an alternate base period is available.
Wenger, supra note 3, at 16. See generally NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
PROJECT, WHAT IS AN "ALTERNATE BASE PERIOD" & WHY DOES MY STATE
NEED ONE (2003) (showing how base periods work and which state permits
added flexibility with ABPs) available at http://www.nelp.org/ui/state/access/
abpfactsheet041003.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
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earnings to qualify. 4
Advocates point out that these eligibility exclusions rely on
antiquated notions of which workers "deserve" benefits. In the
1930's, the UI system favored full-time work because the average
worker was a male head of household with a non-working spouse
who assumed primary responsibility for household necessities.
Policy makers felt that workers who worked only part-time did not
demonstrate a genuine attachment to the workforce and should
not be eligible for UI. For this same reason, states calculated
earnings levels so that only full-time workers would qualify."
These rules are becoming increasingly unworkable in the
modern workforce that now includes a growing number of women,
part-time workers, and low-wage service workers in high turnover
positions. In response, worker advocates have designed model
Twenty states have
legislation to address these problems.
reformed their UI codes to accommodate the part-time workforce."
With the wide-spread use of computers and internet technology,
twelve states have adopted an alternate base period that computes
qualifying wages using the last completed calendar quarter."
Even as states address outmoded eligibility requirements,
however, another equally important feature of UI law is receiving
far less attention than it deserves. Commentators are neglecting
the whole array of disqualifications based upon the circumstances
Every state's UI system utilizes
of separation from work.
standard disqualifications to ensure that only those who become
unemployed "through no fault of their own" receive benefits. 8 The
two predominant disqualifications are for workers who commit
"misconduct" at work and workers who "voluntarily terminate" or

14. For a definition of base period in Illinois, see 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/237 (2000). See also CYNTHIA K. GUSTAFSON & PHILLIP B. LEVINE, LESS
SKILLED WORKERS, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

SYSTEM (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6489, 1998).
15. The rules defining the base period for wages grew from administrative
necessity, when in the days preceding computers, administrators of the UI
system needed at least three months to process employer wage reports
submitted in paper form on a quarterly basis in order to determine the
claimant's wages.
16. See generally BALDWIN & MCHUGH, supra note 6 (noting that eight
states offer benefits to part-time workers in most circumstances. Twelve
additional states may allow workers receiving UI benefits to maintain
eligibility by looking for part-time work, depending on the worker's prior work
history and reason for wanting only part-time work).
17. See MAURICE EMSELLEM, ET AL., FAILING THE UNEMPLOYED: A STATE
BY STATE EXAMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEMS 5-7 (Econ.
Policy Inst., Nat'l Employment Law Project, 2002) (noting that shortcomings
in the UI system prevent many workers from ever qualifying for benefits).
18. For the historical origin of this requirement, see Gladys Harrison,
Eligibility and Disqualification For Benefits-Statutory Purpose and
"Involuntary Unemployment," 55 YALE L.J. 117, 118 (1945).
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quit their employment. 9 These disqualifications potentially affect
all unemployment claimants except workers separated due to a
traditional pink-slip layoff.'0 For this reason, advocates have not
ignored the issue of disqualifications altgether. They have
included liberalization of voluntary leave laws in campaigns to
modernize state UI systems, noting that the disqualification for
voluntarily terminating a position disproportionately affects
women."
Approximately thirty states now permit victims of
domestic violence to voluntarily terminate their employment
because of the abuse they have suffered and still collect UI
benefits." Fifteen other states will not disqualify a person who
quits work due to "compelling and necessitous [personal or family]
circumstances."'
Few advocates have undertaken a comparable
public re-evaluation of the second major disqualification, affecting
workers who have been fired for "misconduct."
The word "misconduct" carries a stigma that connotes fault.
Often misconduct involves affirmative acts such as chronic
absenteeism, insubordination, or rule violations that do not compel
sympathy.
However, like the initial eligibility rules, the
"misconduct" disqualification is a product of the economy,
workplace, and culture of the 1930's. Thus, many states have
interpreted their misconduct disqualification provisions to require
total obedience to workplace rules and near perfect attendance,

19. For the relevant Illinois statutes, see 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602
(2000) (defining worker discharge for felony misconduct). See also 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/601 (2000) (defining "voluntary leaving" as leaving work
without good cause attributable to the employer).
20. Together, eligibility restrictions and disqualifications prevent 30% of
unemployment claimants from collecting benefits. See WAYNE VROMAN,
EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 2 (The Urban
Inst., No. A-22, 1998) (stating that "only a small fraction of adult welfare
recipients ... will become eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
under current rules").
Id. at 1, available at http://www.urban.org/
url.cfm?ID=308031. For a discussion of how disqualifications affect recipiency,
see Daniel P. McMurrer & Amy B. Chasanov, Trends in Unemployment
Insurance Benefits, 118 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 30, 36 (1995).
21. Many state UI statutes require that an employee's reason for quitting
be "attributable to the employer" in order to collect benefits. WOMEN, LOW
WAGE WORKERS & UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 13.
This rule disadvantages women because they are over five times more likely
than men to leave a job because of family conflicts. Id. Illinois retains the
"attributable to the employer" language with only limited exceptions, not
including domestic violence. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/601 (2000).
22. See generally NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, EXPANDING
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR LoW-WAGE WORKERS: STATE LEGISLATIVE

HIGHLIGHTS 1996-2001 3-4 (2001) [hereinafter EXPANDING UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE] (stating that over thirty states allow a person to qualify for
unemployment benefits when quitting is due to domestic violence) available at
http://www.nelp.org.
23. Id. at 4.
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and have assumed that employers have no duty to accommodate
workers who face compelling problems.
Like eligibility
restrictions, these biases disproportionately affect women, lowwage workers, and individuals trying to transition from welfare to
work.
This article explores the disjunctions between the
expectations built into the disqualification for misconduct and the
experience of the modern workforce.
To illustrate these
disjunctions, the article adopts a case-study approach, using
Illinois "misconduct" cases. The paper then makes the case for
including a fundamental reexamination of disqualifications for
misconduct as part of the national debate over ways to improve
the UI system.
Part I describes the various rules and procedures that make
up the UI system, and explains the history and role of
disqualifications as a component of that system. Part IIfocuses on
disqualification for misconduct, first by tracing the development of
that term within the common law, and then by examining Illinois
misconduct jurisprudence from the period 1935-1988, a time when
Illinois utilized a common law definition of misconduct. This
section of the article chronicles the types of employee behavior
that typically resulted in disqualification and evaluates the
fairness of the common-law standard as applied to prevailing labor
market conditions.
Part III examines the standard of "statutory misconduct,"
which was adopted in Illinois in 1988 as a result of efforts by
unions and advocates for low-wage workers. Subsections within
part III use examples drawn from case law to show how, for each
of the elements of the statutory definition, the Illinois Department
of Employment Security (IDES) and Illinois courts have failed to
interpret the statute as written; how they have imbued statutory
misconduct with outdated cultural assumptions, and thereby have
transformed the disqualification into a standard that does not
make sense for today's labor force.
Part IV addresses the policy implications that result from
IDES' and the courts' refusal to read the language of statutory
misconduct in light of modern workplace realities. This section
also demonstrates that current jurisprudence is both economically
and socially unsound, and that it is unduly prejudicial to low-wage
workers. Part V concludes with policy recommendations drawn
from the experiences of several states that use a more nuanced
approach to worker "misconduct."
I.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE SYSTEM

Before 1935, the federal government did not recognize
unemployed workers as a special class of citizens in need of federal

20031
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Unemployed workers, like all other
financial assistance.
impoverished citizens, depended on state welfare programs for
aid.24 In operating these social welfare programs, many states
assumed that able-bodied unemployed persons were especially
These states viewed their
undeserving of public support.
joblessness as a direct result of personal failings-inferior moral
character and poor work ethic. Such attitudes can be traced back
to fourteenth-century England, where authorities scrutinized ablebodied men who could not secure work, withholding economic aid,
and even doling out physical punishment for their apparent
"refusal" to work.2"
In the early twentieth century, American attitudes regarding
unemployment still reflected the English legacy. Legal historian
Philip Harvey explains that, except during brief periods of
economic recession, Americans viewed joblessness as a "voluntary
phenomenon.""
Society considered unemployed people to be of "suspect moral
character who chose to live lives of idleness rather than accept
presumptively available employment."27 For this reason, the
public's attitude toward joblessness "emphasized the denial of
assistance to able-bodied persons except in conjunction with
disciplinary work requirements designed to weed out the workshy, punish the lazy, and mold character."2"
Even after England created a national UI system in 1911, 29
Americans openly criticized the English for fostering "doles from
the public treasury." ° No American state was able to garner
enough legislative support for UI legislation.3'
24. See Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, 6
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 1, 3-8 (1999) (tracing the development of aid
to the able-bodied unemployed in England and the United States prior to the
New Deal). See also Witte, supra note 5, at 21-25 (discussing the historical
aspects of unemployment insurance).
25. See Harvey, supra note 24, at 4-11 (providing an overview of the
development of legal and social treatment of the unemployed through the
sixteenth century). As Harvey explains, this "refusal" to work was frequently
due to the unavailability of jobs. Id. at 13-15. See also Philip Harvey, An
Analysis of the PrincipalStrategies that Have Influenced the Development of
American Employment and Social Welfare Law During the 20th Century, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L., 677, 681 (2000) [hereinafter Principal
Strategies] (arguing that the "key to understanding the strengths and
limitations of competing strategies for combating joblessness lies in a careful
assessment of differing explanations of what causes joblessness").
26. Harvey, supra note 24, at 41.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Witte, supra note 5, at 22.
30. See id. at 22-24 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON
UNEMPLOYMENT 25, 28 (1921)).
31. One major obstacle that prevented states from enacting UI legislation
before 1935 was the fear that adding to an employer's costs of doing business
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The Wisconsin legislature rejected unemployment legislation
in ten consecutive legislative sessions before becoming the first
state to enact such legislation in 1932.32 This victory was hollow,
however, because of the compromises the legislative sponsors
accepted to secure passage of the bill.3
Under the statute
employers who created independent UI reserves could opt out of
the state system, and the legislation would not take effect unless
an insufficient number of employers created independent
programs. 34 Thus, the enactment of the federal legislation was
preceded by fervent debate at the state level over the prudence of
government-sponsored aid to the unemployed."
This hostile American political climate did not improve until
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt garnered broad public
support, and people came to recognize, based on their shared
experience of the Great Depression, that market fluctuations
contribute to unemployment.36
During the depression of the
1930's, the growing population of able-bodied unemployed
consisted not of malingering social outcasts, but rather of working
men laid off from factory jobs. As these men and their families
suffered the devastating emotional and financial effects of
unemployment, 7 their plight proved to the collective American
consciousness that not all unemployment results from inferior
temperament or insincere desire to work.3 8 Thus, the United
would place the enacting state at a comparative disadvantage in interstate
commerce. See Witte, supra note 5, at 28.
32. Id. at 23-26.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 21-25.
35. Id. at 25-29.
36. Harvey attributes this shift in support for the unemployed to a larger
shift in views on the cause of joblessness, from a "behaviorist approach" that
viewed unemployment as being attributable to and remediable by the worker's
own conduct, to a "job shortage approach" that attributed unemployment to
the market's failure to provide jobs for all job seekers. PrincipalStrategies,
supra note 25, at 686-94. Harvey asserts that current social welfare policy
marks a return to behaviorist perspectives. Id. For an explanation of the role
President Roosevelt played in the passage of the Act see Witte, supra note 5,
at 29-34.
37. The physical and emotional ramifications of unemployment include:
"severe mental and physical health problems, increased rates of suicide and
attempted suicide, serious family and relationship problems and increased
criminal activity." Principal Strategies, supra note 25, at 679-80 (internal
footnotes omitted).
38. Economics, and more particularly the theories of John Maynard
Keynes, added legitimacy to the UI system by positing that providing financial
assistance to America's large population of unemployed people would increase
consumer spending, thereby counteracting depressive market forces. See
Thomas Earl Geu & Martha S. Davis, Work: A Legal Analysis In the Context of
the ChangingTransnationalPoliticalEconomy, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1679, 1692
(1995) (citing JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936)).
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States created a national program to aid unemployed workers as
part of the Social Security Act of 1935."9 The Act created a federalstate partnership in which the federal government pays for the
administration of state UI trust funds that accumulate during
periods of economic prosperity and are expended in economic
downturns to stabilize the economy and aid the unemployed.40
To build these UI reserves, states levy a UI tax on employers
based on a portion of each employee's salary; workers do not
contribute directly to the UI system.4' Employer UI taxes are
experience-rated and increase to reflect the number of employees
who collect unemployment benefits.42 Thus, by charging employers
with a history of layoffs a higher tax, state UI systems operate as a
financial disincentive for employers considering reductions in
force.'
The federal Act contains few programmatic provisions and
reflects a national policy decision to delegate to the states almost
exclusive control over design of UI programs." Following the
passage of the Act, states created nearly identical legal
39. 42 U.S.C. § 503 (2000).
40. Id. § 502.
41. Sachin S. Pandya, Retrofitting Unemployment Insurance to Cover
Temporary Workers, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 907, 924-29 (1999). Although
workers do not contribute directly, the cost to employers resulting from the
experience-rated funding mechanism is often passed on to the workers
through lower wages and decreased employment benefits. Id. at 926.
42. Id. at 924-29. As a result of this funding system, employers often feel
as if they pay for an unemployment claimant's benefits dollar for dollar. In
fact, employers pay unemployment taxes regardless of whether the claimant
later collects UI benefits. Id. See Earle V. Simrell, Employer Fault vs.
General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J.
181, 185-96 (1945) (noting that when experience rating was first introduced,
employers and some courts sought to limit it to instances where the employer
was at fault for the separation). Mr. Simrell provides an interesting
discussion of the historical effect of experience rating on disqualifications. Id.
See OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, supra note 1, at 50 (describing state methods
for taxing employers). See also CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, THE
TEMPORARY STAFFING INDUSTRY AND U.S. LABOR MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM 1, 4 (America's Workforce

Network
Research
Conference,
Research
Paper,
2001)
at
http://wdr.doleta.gov/conference/pdf/mehta.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
43. One of the stated purposes behind the Illinois UI statute is to
"encourage stabilization of employment." 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/100
(2000). For a discussion of how experience-rating stabilizes employment see
Pandya, supra note 41, at 925 (noting that "without experience-rating,
employers could shift those costs onto UI by temporarily laying off workers
during slumps in consumer demand rather than keep those workers on the
payroll").
44. Witte, supra note 5, at 21-25. See also OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, supra
note 1, at 14 (stating that "[wlithin certain limits, states have full autonomy in
carrying out their basic program operations. They decide the requirements
that unemployed workers must meet for eligibility, the amount of benefits,
and the length of time they will pay benefits").
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frameworks, consisting of complex eligibility and disqualification
provisions, to determine which unemployed workers would receive
benefits.
In contrast to social welfare programs based on
entitlement,45 the unemployment compensation system is rooted in
insurance principles, 46 distinguishing between those who deserve
benefits and those who do not 7 An individual establishes initial
eligibility, or a compensable loss, by proving that she or he has a
significant attachment to the workforce, ' is actively seeking fulltime work, 49 and is able and available to return to the labor force.5'
Claimants who satisfy these eligibility requirements then face
disqualification if they are deemed to be at fault for being
unemployed.5 Although the economic and social phenomena of the
Great Depression tipped the scale in favor of government support
for the unemployed, states did not abandon their historic

45. For a discussion of the interaction between UI and other federal welfare
programs, see SAFETY NET supra note 1, at 7-9.
46. European unemployment compensation systems are not uniformly
grounded in insurance concepts. For a comparison of European and U.S.
systems, see generally WAYNE VROMAN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE: A COMPARISON (The Urban Inst. & The World

Bank, 2001) available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/labormarkets/
courses/dc2003/proceedings/pdfpaper/module3wvl.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
47. The whole notion that certain separated employees are undeserving is
one that should be considered critically. Many of the individuals labeled as
work-shy suffer other maladies such as mental illness, inadequate housing, or
domestic violence-social ills not discussed publicly in the early decades of the
20th century. A recent study of barriers that welfare recipients encounter
when looking for regular employment found that 25.4% reported a major
depressive disorder, 14.6% had post traumatic stress disorder, 7.3% had
generalized anxiety disorder, and another 14.9% identified themselves as
victims of domestic violence. SANDRA DANZIGER ET AL., BARRIERS TO THE
EMPLOYMENT OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS 32 (Poverty Research & Training Ctr.,
Univ. of Mich., Research Paper, 2000) at http://www.jcpr.orglwpfiles/Danziger.
barriers.update2-21-2000.PDF (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
48. To prove work force attachment, states require that a claimant earn a
specified amount in his/her base period. Illinois requires earnings of $1600
within the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters. In addition,
a claimant must earn $440 in the quarter other than the quarter in which her
earnings are highest. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/237 (2000). Illinois does not
have an alternate base period for individuals who fail to qualify under this
provision.
49. The Illinois UI statute does not require a claimant to search for fulltime work. However, IDES added this requirement by regulation. 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/407 (2000); 56 ILL. ADM. CODE 2865.125 (2003).

50. The unemployment insurance system was not designed to aid those
unable to work due to physical infirmity, conflicting family responsibilities or
other extenuating circumstances. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/500 (2000); Ill.
Reg. 2720.115, 2720.120. At the inception of the UI system, the founders
envisioned that such individuals would be aided by the traditional social
welfare programs. SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 7-9.
51. Harrison, supra note 18, at 118.
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reservations about providing aid to the able-bodied unemployed.
Every state UI statute enacted following the creation of the federal
program included disqualifications aimed at restricting benefits to
those unemployed "through no fault of their own." 2
Disqualifications strike an uneasy compromise between
1930's notions of wanting to support honest working men during
layoffs and earlier convictions that public funds should not be
squandered on workers prepared to connive to avoid working.
Disqualifications also perform a function in keeping with the
insurance model of benefit distribution-like suicide exclusions in
life insurance policies and in home insurance policies for arson by
the owner, disqualifications act like gate-keepers against persons
who lack a sincere desire to work and who seek to create situations
where they can rely on government financial support. 3
By using disqualifications to limit benefits to workers
involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own, states can
scrutinize workers applying for benefits and ensure that they
"deserve" government financial assistance. 4 Nearly all states thus
closely examine the reason for claimants' separation from
employment. Straight layoffs arouse almost no suspicion, whereas
employees who quit a job or who are fired trigger close scrutiny. If
an investigation by state administrators reveals that a person
claiming unemployment benefits was terminated for "misconduct,"
voluntarily quit a job without good cause, 55 or refused a suitable
job offer, then she or he is disqualified from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits. 6 With these limitations,
52. Katherine Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and
Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147, 149 (1945).
53. See id. (providing a discussion of the several theories behind
disqualifications).
54. See id. at 150-51 (noting that "[ulnemployment compensation is limited
to 'involuntary' unemployment because public opinion would not support the
payment of benefits as a matter of right to persons 'voluntarily'
unemployed....
One of the factors which influences, consciously or
unconsciously, the popular judgment as to whether a claimant should be
entitled to unemployment benefits is whether his conduct is consistent with a
genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting or whether it indicates that
the claimant is seeking to take advantage of his benefit rights in order to have
a 'vacation' from work"). Id.
55. See EXPANDING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, supra note 22 (noting

significant variation among state disqualifications for quitting a job).
56. Determining whether a particular individual committed misconduct at
work involves a detailed factual analysis of the circumstances leading up to
the termination of employment.
In Illinois, an UI claimant facing
disqualification for misconduct has the right to participate in an
administrative hearing where an administrative law judge, called a hearings
referee, considers testimony by both the employer and the employee as to the
circumstances surrounding the discharge. The hearings referee will then
make a determination as to whether the employee's conduct constitutes
misconduct under the laws of Illinois. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/800 (2000);
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unemployment compensation functions as both a social welfare
program, providing a basic level of income support to unemployed
workers, and a national insurance policy against economic
downturns.
UI is a ready resource for laid-off workers but
disqualifications ensure that the benefits cannot be easily obtained
through deceit.
II.

THE DISQUALIFICATION FOR MISCONDUCT: LEGAL STANDARDS

Of the three basic disqualifications listed above, the
disqualification for misconduct is the forfeit provision for workers
who are terminated or discharged from their last place of
employment.
Determining whether a worker's act will be
disqualifying has never been clear-cut, because the majority of
state unemployment legislation left the term "misconduct"
undefined. Courts relied on the common law to impart specific
meaning to the disqualification. In 1941, Wisconsin issued the
first published definition of the term misconduct in Boynton Cab v.
Neubeck and Industrial Commission.7 In Boynton, a taxi driver
was terminated after eight weeks of employment for overcharging
a customer and pocketing the surcharge, for being partly
responsible for three minor traffic accidents, and for allegedly
failing to report the full extent of the damage incurred in two of
these accidents.' His employer terminated him following the third
accident for "his entire bad record of violations of company rules,
[after he] had been given many warnings for these
violations ....
In considering whether the Wisconsin
disqualification for misconduct precluded him from receiving
benefits, the Court first had to address what scope the legislature
intended for the term "misconduct."60
The Court consulted ordinary usage of the term
"misconduct"61 as well as English common law.6' Based on these
Ill. Reg. 2720.200.
This determination is then appealable within the
administrative agency.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/800 (2000); Ill. Reg.
2720.300. The final decision of the administrative agency is appealable to the
state court under the Administrative Review Act. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3101 (2000). For analysis of importance of legal representation throughout this
administrative review process, see Maurice Emsellem & Monica Halas, Part
II: Unemployment Compensation and Procedural Issues: Representation of
Claimants at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings: Identifying Models
and Proposed Solutions, 29 U MICH. J.L. REF. 289 (Fall 1995/Winter 1996).
57. 296 N.W. 636, 639 (Wis. 1941).
58. Id. at 637-38.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id. at 638-40.

61. Id. at 639. The court listed the following common interpretations of the
word misconduct:
[B] ad behavior; improper conduct; mismanagement; wrong behavior;

wrong conduct; any improper or wrong conduct; in usual parlance, a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
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sources and on the stated intent of the legislation to ameliorate
the harsh effects of unemployment,63 the Court set forth the
following definition:
[Tihe intended meaning of the term "misconduct,"... is limited to
conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's
interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of
his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or
recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil
design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the
employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to
his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated
instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to
be deemed "misconduct."6
Under this definition, the Court found the taxi driver eligible
for unemployment benefits, despite his violation of several
workplace rules and his failure to report two accidents, because
his conduct did not manifest an unreasonable and improper course
of conduct.'
The analysis in Boynton provided a definition of misconduct
that dominated case law in Illinois, and across the nation, for
nearly fifty years.'
Because the majority of states still define
misconduct according to the common law, Boynton continues to be
cited with approval today.67 The earliest published misconduct
discretion is left, except what necessity may demand. 'Misconduct' does
not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention. The term implies
a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. It is said to be
synonymous with 'delinquency'; 'misbehavior'; 'misdeed'; 'misdemeanor';
'mismanagement'; 'offense'; and distinguishable from 'carelessness.'
Id.
62. Id. at 640-41.
63. Id. at 639-40.
64. Id. at 640. Illinois formally adopted the definition of misconduct
expounded in Boynton in Jackson v. Board of Review, 475 N.E.2d 879, 884-85
(Ill. 1985).
65. Boynton, 296 N.W. at 642.
66. See, e.g., Carroll v. Ala. Public Serv. Comm'n, 206 So. 2d 364, 366 (Ala.
1968); Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902, 904 (Alaska 1991); Kartsonis v. Dist.
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 289 A.2d 370, 372 (D.C. 1972) (Nebeker, J.,
dissenting); Walker v. State of Florida, 720 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Mattson v. Dep't of Labor, 455 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983);

Osojnick v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 158 N.E.2d 656, 659
(Ind. Ct. App. 1959); Garfield v. Dir. of Div. of Employment Sec., 384 N.E.2d
642, 644 (Mass. 1979); Loewen v. Lakeland Mental Health Ctr., 532 N.W.2d
270, 273 (Minn Ct. App. 1995); Hins v. Western, 484 N.W.2d 491, 495 (N.D.
1992); Lee v. S. C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 291 S.E.2d 378, 379 (S.C. 1982).
67. See Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Hudson, 757 So. 2d 1010, 1014
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Neubauer v. Job Serv. N.D., 512 N.W.2d 428, 431 (N.D.
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cases in Illinois delineate four potential grounds for misconduct: 1)
a wilful disregard of the employer's interests; 2) a deliberate
violation of the employer's rules; 3) a disregard of the standards of
behavior rightfully expected by the employer; and 4) negligence to
such a degree or with such recurrence that the employee's actions
manifest an intent to disregard his/her responsibilities.' In cases
where the employee's actions endangered coworkers or public
safety, Illinois courts disqualified claimants regardless of whether
they had wrongful intentions, or scienter. 9
In 1985, the Illinois Supreme Court, considering the meaning
of misconduct for the first time,7 ° further clarified the
circumstances under which an employee's violation of a work rule
would constitute misconduct. In Jackson v. Board of Review,71 the
Court considered whether a claimant could be denied benefits for
repeatedly violating an employer rule prohibiting workers from
drinking alcohol on the job. The Court found the claimant
ineligible using the Boynton definition of misconduct and made the
following additional points: 1) if a disqualification rests on
employee violation of an employer rule, the rule must be
reasonable; 2) there must be some nexus between the rule and the
employment; and 3) a claimant's actions need not harm or
potentially harm the employer to be disqualifying." Because the
claimant in Jackson deliberately violated a known rule, the Court
did not consider the alternative ground for finding misconduct that a claimant's act, though it violates no rule, disregards an
employer's interests or expectations .
By the mid 1980's Boynton's murky reference to employer
expectations had produced a broad spectrum of disqualifying

1994); Bunch v. Bd. of Review, 690 A.2d 335, 337 (R.I. 1997).
68. Winklmeier v. Bd. of Review, 450 N.E.2d 353, 354-55 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983).
69. See Granite City Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Review, 385
N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that claimant, a millwright
helper, committed misconduct by deliberately disregarding safety rules and
jeopardizing the safety of co-workers).
70. Prior to 1988, Section 602A disqualified claimants discharged "for
misconduct connected with work" without further defining "misconduct." 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602A (2000).

71. 475 N.E.2d 879 (Ill. 1985).
72. The claimant argued that despite violating a work rule, her conduct was
not disqualifying unless the employer could show "substantial actual harm to
its interests." Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 884. The Jackson court rejected this
argument outright, finding that neither harm nor potential harm was
necessary to prove misconduct. Id.
73. Id. at 886. The Boynton Court stated that there are "standards of
behavior which the employer has a right to expect." Boynton, 296 N.W. at 639.
That statement proved challenging to apply to specific facts, leading the
dissenting Justice in Jackson to describe the definition as "amorphous to the
point of being meaningless." Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 886.
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behavior.
At one extreme, acts of open insubordination,74
deliberate falsification of job records,75 and drinking on the job"6
almost ensured disqualification.7
In the middle, acts such as
tardiness" or being argumentative became disqualifying when
they were excessive or were repeated after employer warnings. At
the other extreme, negligence, 9 inability to meet employer
expectations, ° or poor judgment did not constitute disqualifying
misconduct. Underlying common law misconduct jurisprudence is
the implicit assumption that workers who deliberately violate a
known employer rule or who commit acts in the moderate to
extreme range of the spectrum do so knowing that unemployment
will likely result.
Applying this premise to a wide range of discharge scenarios
was workable in the early decades of the 20th century, when
workplace norms, rules, and expectations were widely known and
substantially uniform. During much of the twentieth century, the
American economy was highly dependent on manufacturing," an
industry in which the economic demand for labor was derived from

74. See Carroll v. Bd. of Review, 477 N.E.2d 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding
insubordination and misconduct where the employee used moderately abusive
language and questioned the authority of his immediate superior to terminate
him); Walthall v. Dep't of Labor, 497 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(disqualifying claimant for refusing to comply with supervisor's instructions
not to eat in a work area for safety reasons). But see Gee v. Bd. of Review, 483
N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding eligible a claimant who was
merely argumentative and who refrained from abusive or threatening
language); Sheff v. Bd. of Review, 470 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(finding that merely being argumentative does not meet the definition of
misconduct).
75. See Roundtree v. Bd. of Review, 281 N.E.2d 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
(disqualifying claimant security guard for intentionally misrepresenting his
criminal record on employment application). See also Winklmeier, 450 N.E.2d
at 355 (disqualifying claimant after intentionally submitted false health
insurance claims to employer).
76. Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 884.
77. The historical development of Illinois case law, defining misconduct on
a spectrum, mirrors the approach of other states. See David R. Packard,
Unemployment Without Fault:DisqualificationsFor Unemployment Insurance
Benefits, 17 VILL. L. REV. 635 (1972).
78. See Gregory v. Bernardi, 465 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding
that repeated tardiness was sufficient to disqualify an employee). But see also
Wright v. Dep't of Labor, 519 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that a
single documented act of tardiness was insufficient for disqualification).
79. Siler v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 549 N.E.2d 760 (Ill. App Ct. 1989).
80. See Pesce v. Bd. of Review, 515 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding
poor driving in violation of employer's expectations did not justify
disqualification); See also Loveland Mgmt. Corp. v. Bd. of Review, 520 N.E.2d
1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that failure to perform work duties did not
justify disqualification).
81. SAFETY NET, supra note 1. See generally Wandner & Stengle, supra
note 1.
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a need for physical manpower to carry out the manufacturing
process and employees are valued for strength, stamina, and
sufficient mental capacity to perform manual tasks without a
hitch.82 Even the workplace itself was relatively uniform, being
largely comprised of male heads of household, working in full-time,
long-term employment arrangements.83 Workplace mores in the
early twentieth century reflected this need for efficient production
and emotionless execution of tasks. In 1911, Frederick Winslow
Taylor's popular management theory directed employers to: 1)
reduce all knowledge to specific workplace rules; 2) remove all
possible mental work from the place of employment; and 3) assign
workers specific tasks to complete in a predetermined amount of
time.'
Authoritarian managerial styles born out of this
philosophy exacted hard, repetitive labor from employees.
Throughout this period, strong union activity85 put limitations on
at-will employment, which otherwise allowed employers broad
latitude in exercising their prerogative to hire and fire. Union
representation kept workers informed of workplace rules and
policies and aware of established consequences for breach of these
rules.'8 In the event of termination, union grievance procedures
82. The industrial revolution and the introduction of machines operated by
low-skilled workers impersonalized the workplace and made workers more
fungible than they had been in earlier periods of American history, when local
economies were based more on farming and apprenticeships were common.
Geu & Davis, supra note 38, at 1686-87.
83. While several unemployment rules, like the rule requiring a claimant to
be available for full-time work on any shift, assume that workers have an athome counterpart responsible for household responsibilities, these norms
reflect the experience of middle-class and upper-class white families during
the 1950's.
See Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation and
Eligibility: Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing
Work/Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 158-59 (Fall 1995/Winter
1996) (noting also that these norms fail to reflect the experience of minority
workers and low-income families).
84. See Geu & Davis, supra note 38, at 1690 (quoting FREDERICK W.
TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1967)).

85. Many landmark legal protections of the union-represented workforce
were also established during this time period. See Geu & Davis, supra note
38, at 1691 (citing the establishment of landmark legal protection for
organized labor, such as the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449, 449-57 (1935) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060,
1060-69 (1938)).
86. The results of union representation are summed up in the "traditional
workplace contract" which consisted of:
(1) annual real wage increases and cost-of-living adjustments, (2)
extensive collectively bargained job-related benefits, (3) the seniority
system for layoffs and promotions, (4) negotiated conditions of work and
narrow job classifications, (5) grievance and arbitration provisions, (6)
on-site union representation, and (7) retention of management
prerogatives over many workplace issues and virtually all strategic
enterprise decisions.
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protected employees from arbitrary decisions."
In this cultural environment, an intentional violation of an
employment rule served as a predictable indicator of an insincere
desire to work because following rules was part and parcel of the
work, central to efficient business operation.
Likewise, the
"standards of behavior" expected by an employer were widely
known and bargained for by unions that gained employment
benefits by sacrificing worker autonomy. Thus, the assumption
implicit in the common law disqualification spectrum is defensible,
namely that employees who commit acts in the extreme to
moderate range of the spectrum should know that unemployment
may result and thus are at fault for being jobless. Given these
norms, the common law could effectively root out "undeserving"
workers without jeopardizing the remedial objectives of the
program. However, by 1987 Illinois advocates for the unemployed
began seriously questioning the common law's continued ability to
perform this function.
III. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MISCONDUCT

In Jackson, attorneys for the unemployed worker argued that
rule violations that cause no actual harm to the employer should
not constitute misconduct.' These advocates reasoned that such a
limitation was necessary to ensure that disqualification did not
arise out of minor rule violations that had no real impact on the
employer. 9
When the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this
argument in Jackson, and held that an act that causes no harm to
the employer can be disqualifying, advocates for the unemployed
responded by mounting a legislative advocacy campaign to
liberalize the misconduct definition altogether."
Instead of
settling for making harm a prerequisite for misconduct, advocates
sought to limit the disqualification to acts of gross misconduct or

See Geu & Davis, supra note 38, at 1694 (quoting BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING
BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN
BUSINESS 43-44 (1992)).
87. See BALDWIN & MCHUGH, supra note 6, at 13 (stating that unions
provided
information
and representation
to
individuals
claiming
unemployment benefits, thereby increasing recipiency rates).
88. Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 884.
89. The following description of the circumstances surrounding the
enactment of the statutory definition of misconduct is based on interviews
with attorneys who worked at the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Metropolitan Chicago during 1986-1988 drafting the statute and working to
secure its passage: telephone interview with Jeffrey Gilbert, Managing
Partner of Johnson Jones Snelling Gilbert & Davis, in Chicago, Illinois
(telephone interview held on June 13, 2002); Bill Martinez, Partner at
McNamara & Martinez, LLP, in Denver, Colorado (telephone interview held
on June 21, 2002).
90. Id.
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at least to intentional acts of misconduct.9' After negotiations and
compromises with representatives of labor, business, and IDES,
advocates for the unemployed succeeded in getting the Illinois
General Assembly to enact a statutory definition of misconduct in
1987.92
Advocates did not succeed in obtaining the more liberal
redefinition of the misconduct disqualification that they originally
envisioned. However, advocates for the unemployed thought the
definition of statutory misconduct enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly was a marked improvement.9' New section 602A of the
Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (the IUIA), specifically
defined misconduct as:
the deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule or policy of
the employing unit, governing the individual's behavior in
performance of his work, provided such a violation has harmed the
employing unit or other employees or has been repeated by the
individual despite a warning or other explicit instruction from the
employing unit.94
Section 602A is well-constructed, setting forth four discrete
statutory elements: 1) deliberate and wilful violation; 2) of a
reasonable employer rule that either 3) occurred despite the
employer's warning or explicit instruction or 4) harmed the
employer.95 Thus, Section 602A follows Jackson's paradigm of
linking disqualification to violations of reasonable rules or policies.
However, Section 602A explicitly overrules the Jackson Court's
holding that the claimant's violation of a reasonable rule need not
have harmed the employer to constitute misconduct.' The statute
allows benefits when an employee is terminated for a single
deliberate violation of a reasonable rule unless the employer
demonstrates that the violation has "harmed" the employer or
another employee. The statutory definition also departs from the
First, it
common law in several other important respects.
eliminates disqualifications for breaching "standards of behavior

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602A (2000).

95. Id. A fifth requirement, that the act of misconduct be "connected with
the work" is rarely an issue. Id. But see Caterpillar Inc. v. Fehrenbacher, 676
N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that an employee who placed a

sign in his truck window reading "scab" did not commit misconduct connected
with work); Robinson v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 637 N.E.2d 631, 633
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); MacAllister v. Bd. of Review, 635 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
96. Courts have also held that in a misconduct case, it is the employer that
bears the burden of proving each element of the misconduct statute. See
App. Ct. 1990) (discussing how an
Adams v. Ward, 565 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill.
employer has the burden to demonstrate the employee's violation).
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which the employer has the right to expect," 97 since neither that
language used in Boynton nor any similar language appears in the
statute. Second, where Boynton clearly disqualified claimants for
certain degrees of negligence, Section 602A requires an element of
intent-a deliberate and wilful rule violation.98
The legislature amended Section 602A without generating
any legislative history to clarify the policy reasons behind the
legislature's word choices. However, in the absence of legislative
history, well-established rules of statutory construction direct
judges to refer to the plain language of the Act for indicia of
legislative intent.'
Nonetheless, neither the verbal clarity of
Section 602A nor well-established canons of statutory construction
have protected the statutory definition of misconduct from being
eroded by Illinois courts working under the guise of judicial
construction.'°°
A. Element I: Deliberate & Wilful Violation
The terms "deliberate and wilful" refer to the worker's state of
mind during the commission of the alleged act of misconduct, and
both require some degree of intent to violate an employer rule.
Since the legislature did not limit the disqualification to an
"intentionalviolation of a reasonable rule," the requisite state of
mind covers more than the specific intent to violate an employer
policy.
In other contexts, Illinois courts have interpreted
wilfulness to mean "consciousness that an injury may probably
result from an act done and a reckless disregard of the
consequences. " '° However, in the unemployment context, Illinois
courts have taken an expansive view of wilfulness, disqualifying
claimants who disregard rules that they were "aware of," without

97. Boynton, 296 N.W. at 640.
98. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602A (2000).
99. Courts are only to consult other canons of statutory construction when
the plain language of the statute is ambiguous or vague. See Paris v. Feder,
688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ill. 1997) (discussing the "cardinal" rule of statutory
construction); Maloney v. Bower, 498 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1986).
100. Courts reviewing an IDES determination of eligibility or
disqualification will not disturb the agency's findings unless: 1) IDES' factual
determination is "against the manifest weight of the evidence" or 2) IDES'
legal determination is contrary to law. See Nichols v. Dep't of Employment
Sec., 578 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991); see also Collier v. Ill.
Dep't of Employment Sec., 510 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
However, courts are also supposed to construe the Act liberally in favor of
unemployed workers. Davis v. Bd. of Review, 465 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1984); Popoff v. Ill. Dep't of Labor, 494 N.E.2d 1266, 1267 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1986).
101. Brown v. Ill. Terminal Co., 150 N.E. 242, 244 (Ill. 1925); see also
O'Brien v. Township High Sch. Dist., 415 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ill. 1980)
(discussing the requirement for a wilful and wanton injury).
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10 2
regard to whether the claimant acted wilfully.
In Harvey v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, °3 a
security guard was aware of two conflicting rules: she had to
perform a head count of ex-offenders in a rehabilitation program
by 4:00 a.m., but she was also never supposed to leave her control
room work station unattended." Harvey's co-worker, who should
have covered the control room while Harvey performed the head
count, had gone on break and not returned. °5 Harvey testified
that, as the 4:00 a.m. deadline approached, she decided to lock the
Despite Harvey's
control room and perform the head count."
attempts to comply with both employer rules and her careful
consideration of the irreconcilable conflict in her duties, the
Illinois Appellate Court disqualified her under Section 602A,
reasoning that:

Plaintiff was aware of the company rule that the control room was
not to be left unattended. At 3:20 a.m., plaintiff still had
approximately 40 minutes to find her coworker, or contact Harris to
find someone for assistance. These options, which plaintiff failed to
take advantage of, clearly demonstrate that her conduct was not
unavoidable. °7
The court does not even purport to analyze Harvey's state of
mind, but instead disqualifies her for misconduct after summarily
disagreeing with her judgment call. Noting that the claimant was
aware of a company rule does not substitute for an analysis of
whether the claimant's decision to reconcile her duties by locking
the control room was reckless. Likewise, by focusing on the
102. Several Illinois cases have adopted the corollary of this rule, that if the
claimant were unaware of the rule or policy then she did not act deliberately
and wilfully. See Hoffman v. Lyon Metal Prods., 577 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (stating that the claimant met eligibility requirements
because he was not aware of a rule requiring him to obtain a pass before
taking scrap metal); see also Farmers State Bank of McNabb v. IDES, 576
N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist.1991). While the corollary is right, the
premise may not be. Thus, a claimant who is not aware of a rule cannot have
acted deliberately in violating the rule. But a claimant who is aware of a rule
has not necessarily acted deliberately. Additional analysis of the claimant's
state of mind is necessary to show that the conduct is deliberate.
103. Harvey v. IDES, No. 97-L-50804 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 30, 1999)
(unpublished order on file at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan
Chicago (LAFMC)).
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. Id. at 7. Harvey illustrates the Illinois Appellate Court's treatment of
the "deliberate and wilful" element of Section 602A. The facts summarized
herein only relay Harvey's testimony about her dilemma. IDES and the
Circuit Court of Cook County held that the claimant resolved this dilemma by
"penciling in" a head count without having actually performed one. The
Illinois Appellate Court did not resolve this factual dispute, but rather
rendered the quoted passage as an alternative holding. Id.
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"avoidability" of Harvey's rule violation, the court sidesteps any
serious consideration of Harvey's state of mind, instead asking
itself whether the claimant committed a voluntary act, and
whether this voluntary act violated a rule of which the claimant
"was aware." This redefinition of the state of mind required for
disqualification essentially eliminates any need to find either a
deliberate or wilful violation. Finding wilful violation on a record
where the claimant tried to comply with conflicting work demands
but was unsuccessful, amounts to disqualification for a good-faith
error in judgment.
In Scanlon v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,'08
the Illinois Appellate Court extended this expansive interpretation
of "deliberate and wilful" to include classic acts of negligence.
John Scanlon was terminated after performing 26 years of manual
labor for Ecolab, Inc." On the day of his termination, he loaded
what he thought was 60,000 pounds of dense ash into a silo."'
Based on his calculation of the silo's holding capacity, Scanlon
thought the silo could accommodate his load and the 210,000
pounds already inside."' Two successive loading belts burned
after he loaded the ash, so Scanlon alerted a supervisor and
replaced the belts. At the end of his shift, Scanlon left without
completing a log sheet. Ecolab discovered that Scanlon's load2
actually weighed 66,000 pounds, an amount too large for the silo."
A built-in protective probe failed to shut down the system properly
after Scanlon overfilled the silo, and thus the two belts burned."'
The employer stated that once before in his twenty-six years as an
Ecolab employee, Scanlon had been warned about failing to
complete a log sheet. Ecolab terminated Scanlon based on his
overfilling the Silo, failing
to troubleshoot successfully, and failing
4
to complete a log sheet.1
Despite the employer's consistent testimony that Scanlon was
terminated for poor work performance, not for deliberately
violating a rule or policy, the Court found Scanlon ineligible for
benefits. The Court focused entirely on Scanlon's failure to
complete a log sheet and offered virtually no analysis beyond the
following:
the record includes Scanlon's admission that it was part of his job to
log any problems he encountered and he did not log the problems.
Furthermore, Scanlon admitted that he previously had been warned
108. Scanlon v. IDES, No. 1-99-1441 (Ill. App. Ct. June 13,
(unpublished order on file at LAFMC).
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2-3.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id. at 2.

1999)
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about the failure to document any problems. Scanlon's admissions
15
clearly fall within the parameters of wilful conduct.

The Court disregarded the absence of any allegation that
Scanlon had acted with a wrongful purpose and based its
disqualification decision solely on Scanlon's admission.
This
analysis makes clear that the Court's "parameters of wilful
conduct" define a far broader area than the plain language of
Section 602A, which requires a deliberate and wilful violation of a
rule."
Acknowledging a general awareness of employment
obligations and admitting to a failure to perform one of them is not
tantamount to an admission of a deliberate and wilful rule
violation. Cases like Scanlon and Harvey, which hold that an act
is deliberate and wilful if it is committed voluntarily despite
awareness of a contrary employer rule, ignore an entire body of
law that draws strong distinctions between acts that are voluntary
and acts that are committed with general or specific intent.
Treating Harvey's error in judgment and Scanlon's poor work
performance as misconduct, absent any wrongful intent, radically
departs from the statutory language and renders Section 602A
more stringent than the common-law misconduct disqualification
it replaced." 7 Common-law courts gave serious consideration to a
claimant's state of mind, to prevent disqualifying claimants whose
conduct was attributable to errors in judgment, mistakes, or the
inability to meet employer expectations. In 1941, the Boynton
court prophetically warned:
If mere mistakes, errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion,
minor and but casual or unintentional carelessness or negligence,
and similar minor peccadilloes must be considered to be within the
term "misconduct," and no such element as wantonness, culpability
or wilfulness with wrongful intent or evil design is to be included as
an essential element in order to constitute misconduct within the
intended meaning of the term as used in the statute, then there will
be defeated as to many of the great mass of less capable industrial
workers, who are in the lower income brackets and for whose benefit
the act was largely designed, the principal purpose and object under
the act of alleviating the evils of unemployment by cushioning the
shock of a layoff, which is apt to be most serious to such workers." 8
Thus, the claimant in Boynton received benefits, even though
he violated several important rules and policies, because his state
of mind did not reflect an improper motive or purpose."' Illinois
115. Id. at 8.
116. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602A (2000).
117. These conclusions also run contrary to published Illinois case law. See

Siler, 549 N.E.2d at 763 (holding that inadvertence, negligence, incapacity, or
inability do not satisfy the "deliberate and wilful" standard).
118. Boynton, 296 N.W. at 640.
119. Id. at 640-42.
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courts interpreting the common law came to a similar result. In
Pesce v. IDES, the court held that a claimant who admitted
responsibility for multiple accidents involving a company van
remained eligible for benefits precisely because there was no
evidence that he deliberately or wilfully caused the accidents. 2 '
In these cases, whether the employer had warned the worker
not to have another accident or to "drive more carefully" would
have been irrelevant-if a second accident was not "deliberate" and
"wilful," it remained an accident, not misconduct.
The first
element of Section 602A should offer the same protection-a
claimant who violates a rule due to mistake, poor judgment,
inadvertence, or negligence does not do so deliberately and
wilfully. If Harvey made an error of judgment when faced with
conflicting rules, or Scanlon miscalculated what a silo could hold,
then their errors should not have been deemed deliberate and
wilful attempts to disregard the employer's rules. The common
law would have extended them both benefits.
B. Element II: Reasonable Rule or Policy
The outer limits of what constitutes a "reasonable rule or
policy" of the employer are well-established. An employee must be
aware of a rule or policy and understand how to comply with it
before violating the rule or policy constitutes a disqualification. 2'
Thus, an employer must prove that the rule was clear and that the
employee understood compliance to be mandatory," but need not
prove that the rule was written down or otherwise formalized. 23'
Confronted with fact patterns involving serious wrongful acts,
Illinois courts have carved out a series of exceptions to the plain
language of Section 602A under which the employer need not
that it had communicated a rule or
present any evidence proving
1 24
policy to the worker at all.
120. Pesce, 515 N.E.2d at 852.
121. See Adams, 565 N.E.2d at 57-58 (noting that claimant was not aware of
a rule requiring him to launder uniforms that had been placed in a pile of
trash); see Farmers State Bank of McNabb, 576 N.E.2d at 535-37 (discussing
that claimant was not aware of a rule regarding staff deposits procedure, and
that the employer's failure to enforce the rule resulted in claimant not
understanding that compliance was necessary); see also Lyon Metal, 577
N.E.2d at 519-520 (finding claimant eligible for benefits when he was not
aware of rule regarding scrap metal).
122. Adams, 565 N.E.2d at 57-58.
123. See Ray v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 614 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (holding that "there is no mandate in section 602(A) that such
misconduct be in violation of a written rule. ... [I]mplicit in the employment
relationship is the understanding that employees do not steal from
employers").
124. See Meeks v. IDES, 567 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
.we believe plaintiffs argument [that an employer must prove a reasonable
rule by direct evidence] is belied by commonsense business practices. With the
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Some of these exceptions are understandable. For example,
courts can infer the existence of a reasonable rule or policy
through the "commonsense realization that certain conduct
intentionally and substantially disregards an employer's
interest."'25 Thus, courts have not forced employers to take on the
burden of proving that they had express rules prohibiting sexual
harassment of co-workers,'26 physical attacks on co-workers,'27 or
employee theft.'28 Increasingly, however, courts do not restrict the
exception to inherently dangerous or violent acts. 129 For example,
courts tend to lump various actions under the catch-all term
"insubordination" and place them into the same category as
extreme acts of violence, making both grounds for disqualification
without any evidence of a reasonable rule that informs the
employee of the prohibited conduct. 3 °
In Greenlaw v. Department of Employment Security, the
worker's insubordinate act consisted of telling her supervisor to
"kiss my grits" and walking out of the office.'
The Illinois
Appellate Court deemed proof of a reasonable insubordination rule
or policy unnecessary for disqualification because it found "kiss my
grits" abusive, although admittedly not profane.'32 The Court
concluded that, because the phrase was abusive, common sense
should have alerted the claimant that her conduct was
impermissible; the Court required no further proof from the
employer.' 3
Greenlaw's conduct arguably falls within the moderate to

exception of some business ventures engaged in professional sports, any
employer would obviously have a policy against physical violence between coemployees during working hours on the premises."). Id.
125. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 730 N.E.2d 497, 505
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Greenlaw v. IDES, 701 N.E.2d 175, 177) (Ill. App.
1998)). The court further noted that:

[there are] no express findings regarding this issue. However, common
sense implies the existence of a policy against employees continually
making unwanted contact with a coworker at work and outside of work
regarding their romantic relationship, especially when the unwanted
contact interferes with the coworker's ability to perform at work.

Id.
126. Id.
127. See Meeks, 567 N.E.2d at 485-86.
128. Ray, 614 N.E.2d at 198.
129. See Bandemer v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 562 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (Ill. App
Ct. 1990) (finding that failure to comply with a rule requiring employees to

call in when sick constituted misconduct).
130. See Stovall v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 640 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (finding frequent disagreements, calling supervisor a "liar," and

refusing to follow orders constituted misconduct).
131. 701 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

132. Id. at 178.
133. Id.
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extreme range on the common law misconduct spectrum.
However, courts also relax the employer's burden of proof in cases
involving minor episodes of insubordination. Thus the Circuit
Court of Cook County recently upheld the disqualification of an
"insubordinate" claimant who was discharged for "yelling" at her
supervisor.'
When the hearings referee asked about the yelling
incident, the employer provided no details, but admitted that the
worker did not use vulgarity or commit any threatening or abusive
act. The employer also admitted that in nine years the claimant
had never received a warning, and did not describe any
insubordination rule or policy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court
upheld the disqualification. 3 '
IDES has interpreted these and similarly reasoned court
decisions to mean that:
It is, or should be axiomatic, that insubordination in all its forms...
denotes willful and deliberate conduct which undermines authority,
needlessly engenders ill-will, disrupts the good order of the work
place, and is inherently injurious to an employer for these reasons in
the first instance such that proof of prior warnings for related acts is
137
unnecessary.
Thus, IDES has redefined the statutory inquiry under Section
602A when the reason for discharge is "insubordination." Instead
of analyzing whether the specific act violated any rule of the
employer, IDES determines whether the employee was
"insubordinate," according to its own definition.138 Disqualification
flows inexorably from all findings of insubordination.
Such a legal framework not only contrasts sharply with the
language of Section 602A, but also with analysis under the
134. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
135. Oleszczuk v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., No. 00-L-50337 (Ill. App. Ct.
May 20, 1995) (unpublished order is on file at LAFMC, the Circuit Court
decision is found at p. 23 of the Record).
136. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court recently overturned this decision of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, in part because the record did not contain
evidence of what reasonable work rule the employee violated. However, the
Court went on to state that, "We could safely infer that if an employee is
directed to attend a training session, it would be a reasonable work rule to
require that employee attend and show evidence of having learned something.
It could be argued that such a rule is so obvious it need not be stated."
Oleszczuk v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 782 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002). With this dictum, the Court leaves the boundaries of its ability to infer
work rules on insubordination undefined.
137. Vazzana v. IDES, 01-L-51261 (Ill. Cir. Ct. September 19, 2002) (IDES'
position is set forth in the decision of the Board of Review, which is on page 42
of the record) (on file at LAFMC).
138. Id. at 2. IDES comments that "insubordination is committed when a
worker refuses unlawfully to comply promptly with reasonable, job-related
instructions, and subordinate himself to the directives of higher authority."
Id.
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common law.
Allegations of insubordination are inherently
subjective. One person's "yelling" is another person's passionate
self-expression. The term also encompasses a broad range of
conduct from shouting or swearing at management to failing
immediately to obey or questioning a particular order or direction.
Employers do not uniformly punish all of these forms of employee
noncompliance with immediate termination. Common law courts
drew more pragmatic and objective distinctions, disqualifying only
those employees who actually used abusive or threatening
language, jeopardized their co-workers' safety, or defied their
These courts
employers publicly in front of co-workers.'39
recognized that conversations between management and
subordinates about work performance frequently get heated. As
long as arguments occurred privately and did not threaten
management's authority over co-workers, then the employee
remained eligible for benefits.'4
For all but extreme cases of insubordination, Section 602A
should require an employer to prove that it had a reasonable
insubordination rule, which clearly sets forth the proscribed
conduct, and that the claimant had been warned about
Section 602A does not exempt
insubordination in the past.'
insubordination or establish a separate set of rules for analyzing
cases involving insubordination.
C. Element III: Harm
Several Illinois appellate decisions have effectively eliminated
the third element of Section 602A, which requires that, in cases
where the claimant is not a repeat offender, the claimant's rule
violation must have harmed the employer. The plain language of
Section 602A, requires an act that "has harmed" the employer,
meaning that an act that has already caused some demonstrable,
objective harm.' The parties in Jackson had argued over whether

139. Carroll v. Bd. of Review, 477 N.E.2d 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Gee v. Bd.
of Review, 483 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Sheff v. Bd. of Review, 470
N.E.2d 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Walthall v. Dep't of Labor, 497 N.E.2d 782

(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
140. Sheff, 470 N.E.2d at 352; Gee, 483 N.E.2d at 1029-30.
141. Although some acts of insubordination could "have harmed" the
employer in the first instance, one would predict relatively few cases in which
some tangible harm suffered.
the employer could demonstrate
Insubordination would more often become disqualifying when repeated after a
warning.
142. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602A (2000). Despite the legislature's use of
the present perfect tense, IDES promulgated administrative rules defining
harm to include "damage or injury that could be reasonably foreseen to occur
but for the individual being prevented from either carrying out his act or
continuing to work" (examples omitted). Ill. Reg. 2840.25.
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potential harm was disqualifying." The legislature came down in
favor of actual harm, requiring that the act has caused harm, not
that it "could," "may," or "threatens to" to cause harm.'"
Nonetheless, several Illinois decisions deem potential harm
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.4 5 These courts
disqualify claimants based on threatened harm that is both de
minimis'" and speculative. 7
Perhaps even more disturbing,
courts often hypothesize potential harm that could have resulted
from the claimant's conduct without any recorded evidence at all.
Although employers have the burden to prove that a
termination was for misconduct, 148 Illinois appellate courts
sometimes disqualify claimants absent any employer evidence of
harm whatsoever. Thus, in Stavins v. IDES, the Circuit Court of
Cook County upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to a
delivery driver who decided to run his route out of order due to
time pressures. "9 The employer testified that it terminated the
claimant for poor work performance and offered no evidence of
harm, actual or potential. 5 ' The employer also acknowledged that,
143. Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 884-85.
144. For a general discussion of the statutory requirement of harm, and how
courts treat it, see J. Sebastian, To Harm or to Have Harmed: That is the
Question, 27 ADMIN. L., A-16 (Ill. State Bar Ass'n) July-Aug. 1997.
145. A deep division in authority now exists between courts that require the
employer to prove actual harm and courts that do not. See Kiefer v. Ill. Dep't
of Employment Sec., 640 N.E.2d 1252, 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that
the claimant is eligible for benefits when the harm from misconduct is
speculative and the threat of harm is only a remote possibility); see Adams,
206 Ill. App. 3d at 728-29 (finding that Section 602A adds the requirement
that an employer prove actual harm); Zuaznabar v. Bd. of Review, 628 N.E.2d
986, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding mere potential for injury insufficient, and
requiring concrete harm if no prior warnings). Some courts deem potential
harm to be sufficient. See Bandemer, 562 N.E.2d at 8 (threat of financial loss
constitutes harm); Brodde v. Didrickson, 645 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(setting a bad example creates potential harm); Greenlaw, 701 N.E.2d 175 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998) (holding that potential harm to the employer was sufficient, but
there was no discussion of what constitutes potential harm).
146. See Bandemer, 563 N.E.2d at 7-8 (holding claimant's failure to report to
work due to illness delayed opening of a retail store; the "threat of future
financial loss created by the potential for missed sales" was harmful to an
employer).
147. See Brodde, 645 N.E.2d at 991 (disqualifying a supervisor who overrode
a safety mechanism, finding that potential harm to the company arose from
the poor example set for subordinate employees).
148. See Adams, 566 N.E.2d at 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting that "[flirst, an
employer must show the former employee violated a reasonable company rule.
Every violation of a company rule will not constitute misconduct").
149. Stavins v. IDES, No. 01 L 50775 (Ill. Cir. Ct. December 19, 2001)
(unpublished order on file at LAFMC).
150. Stavins involves another common misapplication of law by IDES.
Referees and the Board of Review sometimes comb the record in search of
allegations that meet the definition of misconduct even when, as a matter of
fact, that conduct did not cause the discharge. In Stavins, IDES based the
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despite changing the route, the claimant delivered all the medical
specimens to the laboratory at the customary time. In fact, the
claimant testified that he averted potential harm by rearranging
his route so that he could reach all of the sites within his
remaining time. Without any employer testimony describing how
it was or could have been harmed by the employee's conduct, the
court upheld the administrative agency's disqualification. 5' The
Illinois Appellate Court gave the "harm" element similar
treatment in Greenlaw."2 The Court did not seriously consider
how the claimant's outburst "kiss my grits" harmed her employer
and dismissed the harm element in a single line: "Even though
plaintiffs misconduct occurred in the presence of two supervisors,
it constituted a deliberate disregard for the employer and was
potentially harmful to its interests."'53
Courts that interpret Section 602A to include the "threat of
future harm" further dilute the "harm" requirement, rendering it
meaningless.
A reviewing court can always point to some
potential harm that might occur when an employee violates an
employment rule that is not, on its face, unreasonable. Absence,
tardiness, incompetence,
and negligence of all degrees
theoretically jeopardize employer profitability.'
However, when
an employer fails to describe any harm it suffered or might have
suffered as a result of the claimant's actions, that is strong
circumstantial evidence that the employer has not been harmed.
Courts that invent potentially harmful ramifications exceed their
judicial mandate to interpret statutes based on plain language.
These courts also undermine the declared policy of the Illinois UI
statute, which is "to lighten [the] burden [of unemployment] which

finding of misconduct on the claimant's use of a company phone for personal

calls even though the employer clearly testified that the claimant was
discharged for poor work performance after running his route out of order. Id.
The Circuit Court upheld this finding despite published contradictory caselaw.
See Zuaznabar, 628 N.E.2d at 989 (awarding benefits to claimant bus driver
when he had received no specific prior warning regarding unauthorized stops
and there was no proof of harm).
151. See Stavins, 01 L 50775 at 1 (finding, "1) implicit in the decision of the

hearings referee, as adopted by the Board, is a finding of wilful and deliberate
2) there is a causation based on totality of conduct of the claimant/plaintiff 3)
that there were warnings, but even without warnings, there was actual and/or
potential harm to the employer").
152. Greenlaw, 701 N.E.2d at 177-78.

153. Id. at 178.
154. Carol Kleiman, Not All Benefits are Equal at the Bottom Line, CHI.

TRIB., June 29, 2002 at Bus. 1 (noting that absenteeism costs employers, on
average, $755 per employee per year). See Maggie Jackson, Companies
Adding Benefits for Care of the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 3, at 8
(noting a research study which found that American corporations lose $11

billion annually due solely to absence, lost productivity, and turnover among
employees caring for elderly relatives).
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now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker
and his family."' 55 The purpose of the Act is easily evaded if it can
be read to disqualify employees who are fired for a single incident
of absence, tardiness, insubordination, or negligence, merely
because the infraction has the potential to cause harm to the
employer.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Over the last fourteen years, Illinois courts have transformed
what appeared to be a legislative victory for low-wage workers into
a harsher disqualification standard than the common law
misconduct standard that Section 602A replaced. Many courts
now read Section 602A as if it provided that a person commits
misconduct when: 1) she or he is aware, or should be aware, of 2) a
reasonable rule or policy or "standard of behavior" expected by the
employing unit, and 3) violates the rule or standard through a
voluntary act. This working definition is strikingly more stringent
than the actual language enacted by the Illinois legislature. At
the administrative level, IDES hearings referees, who preside over
administrative hearings to determine eligibility under the Act,
regularly disqualify claimants for "violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to
expect,"" without regard to whether the claimant has violated any
actual rule or policy of the employer. For that matter, referee
decisions routinely fail to make findings on the various statutory
elements of misconduct and often ignore the harm element
altogether."'
What is shocking about Illinois misconduct jurisprudence is
not the outcomes in particular cases (there are several states with
misconduct jurisprudence more conservative than Illinois), but
that the purpose of the 1988 amendment has been so thoroughly
subverted. The amendment enacted in Section 602A had great
potential for bringing misconduct doctrine into conformity with the
experiences of the modern workforce.
Thus, Section 602A
disqualifies employees who are terminated for violating a
"reasonable" rule of the employer. In the modern workforce, where
155. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/100 (2000).
156. Boynton, 296 N.W. at 640.
157. While misapplication of the law by referees can be corrected on appeal,
claimants pay a large price for IDES errors. The statute assumes that the
first six months after a job loss is the critical time during which unemployed
workers most need assistance. However, appealing the decision of a referee
takes up to 120 days, and subsequent appeals in the state court system extend
beyond one year. Misapplication of the law often defeats the purpose the Act,
which is to provide income during the period of unemployment. UI benefits do
not serve their purpose when a claimant receives them a year after being
fired, especially if the claimant has already managed to find replacement
employment.
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most workers have benefit packages including sick and vacation
days," courts might use that provision to find that employers who
refuse to offer any such benefits and then terminate employees for
tardiness or absence do so at their own peril. Looking at workfamily conflicts from a modern perspective, courts might find
employment rules that prevent men and women from balancing
such conflicts unreasonable. 9 Studies point out that "the number
of women in the workforce increased almost 200% between 1950
and 1990. "16° The percentage of mothers working outside the home
reached 65% in 1993.6 Thus, while it may have been reasonable
in the 1930's to require male breadwinners with non-working
spouses to have perfect attendance records, to hold today's workers
to that same standard is Procrustean, outdated, and unreasonable.
Moreover, although several of the opinions cited within this
article disqualify claimants for failing to follow employer rules to
the letter (Harvey who left her control room, Stavins who ran his
delivery route out of order, and Scanlon who did not complete a log
sheet), evidence is mounting that these judicially imposed
standards are out of touch with the realities of the modern

158. Employee benefits now make up a significant portion of employees'
overall compensation. In 1955, fringe benefits comprised 17% of employee
compensation. Michael L. Smith, Mandatory Overtime and Quality of Life in
the 1990s, 21 IOwA J. CORP. L. 599, 600 (1996). In 1991, non-cash benefits
constituted 27.7% of overall compensation, and experts predict this number to
continue to rise to 40% of compensation. Mary E. O'Connell, On The Fringe:
Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1422, 1425
(1993).
159. Today it is almost axiomatic that employers should accommodate workfamily conflicts.
Data indicates that employers do not even sacrifice
profitability when offering certain benefits aimed at harmonizing work and
family responsibilities. Telecommuting, flextime, compressed workweeks,
part-time work, adoption and family leave benefits, and overall flexibility to
take needed time off and work at home, all positively affect the employer's
bottom line. See Kleiman, supra note 154, at Bus. 1 (citing research from the
J. OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES). Some arbitrators of union grievances now
consider work-family conflicts when determining whether a discharge or
discipline was for good cause. For a general discussion of this trend, as well as
suggestion for how courts should take work-family conflicts into account, see
Malin, supra note 83, at 164-74. The author concluded that:
[p]ublic and private workplace values are evolving to recognize that
employees' family obligations may curb employer autonomy in directing
the workforce. These values are evident in the FMLA, state laws
mandating time off for parents to attend school activities, and in
arbitration awards interpreting and applying collective bargaining
agreements to employees faced with work-family conflicts. Evolving
public justice values recognize a growing belief that employers have a
role in accommodating employees' family obligations. These values
should be applied in evaluating UI claims.
Id.
160. Malin, supra note 83, at 133.
161. Id.
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workforce. Failure of an employee to follow an employer rule
unquestioningly, especially for employees who are expected to
exercise judgment in the performance of their duties, is not as
reliable an indicator of an inferior work ethic today as it was
during earlier decades of the twentieth century.
Furthermore,
changes
in
working
conditions
and
demographics have been accompanied by equally dramatic shifts
in the types of jobs that Americans typically occupy. Sixty-seven
years after passage of the federal unemployment legislation,
American manufacturing is becoming a relic.'62 The twenty-firstcentury American economy now depends heavily on the service
industry."
Low- and high-wage earners alike often work in
paraprofessional environments in which authoritarian managerial
styles are less conducive to efficiency because service work does
not depend on rote repetition of tasks according to rigid rules. In
contrast to formulaic management theories of the 1930's,
academics now discuss the profitability of a workforce of creative,
educated minds, easily and quickly retrainable." Industrial policy
analysts predict America's future global competitive advantage
will lie in the ability to be facile at creating and adapting products
for the global marketplace. 65 To move industry in this direction,
they advise against demanding blind adherence to overinclusive
work "rules," commenting that:
M

What will be needed in this kind of economy is competition based on
quality, service, and innovation, stressing efficiency in terms of time
- getting new products and services off the drawing board and into
the economy quickly. No matter what the particular mechanism,
every worker's ideas must be heard and valued, and every worker
needs to be able to change tasks and functions; the worker must
broaden skills and take personal responsibility for product quality
and continued education and retraining. The business organization
must provide time and money for such retraining. Merely speeding
up the production line to increase worker productivity is not the
answer in the global economy.166
162. See Geu & Davis, supra note 38, at 1701 (noting that "as many as 30
million U.S. workers have been dislocated by restructuring in manufacturing
since 1980"). General Motors alone downsized its US operations staff from
424,000 in 1984 to only 250,000 in 1994. Smith, supra note 158, at 601.
163. In 1997, 68% of low-wage workers and 45% of higher-wage workers,
were employed in services or retail trade. SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 23.
164. Geu & Davis, supra note 38, at 1713.
165. Id. at 1712-13.
166. Id. at 1713. Geu & Davis also predict that work settings will becoming
markedly smaller:
The premise of this Article is that as the economy becomes globalized,
the most commonly used workforce model will shift from the present
large group in a factory (or other large working place) to small, mobile
units with shifting memberships organized on an ad hoc basis to
respond to short- or medium-term job projects. Such a shift seems to be
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Certainly, these perspectives do not condone insubordination,
absenteeism, or violence in the workplace. But no economic or
social gain is achieved by disqualifying a driver because he ran a
route out of order or a security guard because she made the wrong
choice between staying at her station or conducting a head count.
Applying a modern interpretation to the language of Section
602A could propel employers in the direction that these market
analysts predict will prove the most profitable in the twenty-first
century global market-by requiring employers to demonstrate that
they have suffered actual harm as a result of an employee's rule
transgression, and by granting unemployment benefits to people
fired by inflexible employers who refuse to offer claimants
personal, vacation, or sick time off from work. The courts' current
jurisprudence, which disqualifies workers for even minor rule
violations, including absences, in the absence of any benefits,
creates the opposite incentives. 67 This reading of the Act gives an
employer no incentive to adopt a long-term perspective on
employee retention, create decent work-family policies, or tolerate
mistakes. Illinois' misconduct jurisprudence has made it all too
easy for an employer to avoid the consequence of an increased UI
tax rate and to save the additional cost of keeping employees on
through slow times by getting the worker disqualified from UI
benefits for "yelling" at a supervisor, or by issuing one "warning"
for minor tardiness and then firing the employee the second time
she is late. In the face of significant social changes in the nature
of work, Illinois courts have adopted a virtual strict liability theory
that denies unemployment benefits to claimants who do anything
wrong. Judicial analysis that focuses almost exclusively on the
actions and transgressions of the employee without regard to the
reasonableness of the employer's actions is misguided given recent
changes in the workforce.
This disproportionate focus on the worker is also bad
economics. Employees today have no incentive to cause their own
unemployment in order to collect unemployment benefits. In
thirty-two states, the average unemployment check leaves a single
mother living below the poverty line." In most states, claimants
still only receive one-third to one-half of their prior earnings. 9
the inevitable result of the social and technological changes presently
under way.
Id. at 1681.
167. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/100 (2000) (stating that "to encourage
stabilization of employment, compulsory unemployment insurance upon a
statewide scale providing for the setting aside of reserves during periods of
employment to be used to pay benefits during periods of unemployment, is
necessary").
168. See Wenger, supra note 3, at 16.
169. Higher benefit levels correlate with increased recipiency rates, implying
that the more money claimants stand to collect the more often they apply for
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Furthermore, the program is temporary, lasting only six months. 7 '
The economic disincentives inherent in the U1 systems affect lowwage workers severely. Low-wage workers have less access to
such work benefits as vacation days, health insurance, and sick
leave, and fewer personal financial resources to cope with family
problems, illness, or other compelling problems.'71 Thus, they are
less able to avoid discharge (or quitting "voluntarily") for calling in
sick or tardiness-scenarios that will render them ineligible for
benefits."' During times of high labor supply, low-wage workers
are most vulnerable to being replaced by more skilled or less
unemployment. See generally OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, supra note 1 (finding
that 10% higher wage replacement results in 4% increase in recipiency).
170. Illinois unemployment claimants are eligible for twenty-six weeks of
benefits. In addition, federally funded extended unemployment benefits are
also available under certain circumstances. The six-month time limit on the
receipt of unemployment benefits reflects old expectations that laid-off
workers would be recalled to their previous job. In this recession, the
percentage of UI recipients who exhaust six months of benefits before finding
replacement employment is comparatively higher. See MAURICE EMSELLEM,
THE "JOBLESS RECOVERY" & THE GAPS IN THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE SAFETY NET 3-4 (National Employment Law Project, 2002)
available at http'J/ www.nelp.org/docUploads/publ44.pdf
See also
OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that "[u]nemployed
workers are now without jobs for longer periods of time-often exhausting all
their UI benefits-and many are not able to return to their former positions
because their jobs have been abolished").
171. A recent study of low-wage workers in Chicago found that 30% of these
workers "were not allowed to take a sick or vacation day, paid or unpaid,
without risking their jobs."
REBEKAH LEVIN & ROBERT GINSBURG,
SWEATSHOPS IN CHICAGO: A SURVEY OF WORKING CONDITIONS ECONOMIC
INCOME
AND
IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITIES
3
(2000)
available at

http://www.impactresearch.org/documents/sweatshopreportpdf.
"In 1997,
about 70% of low-wage workers were employed in retail trade and services."
SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 22. These industries tend not to use layoffs to
terminate employees, and they have the overall lowest recipiency rates. Id. at
21-22. Low-wage workers also have lower unionization rates to protect them
from unfair discharges. Id. at 22.
172. Low-wage workers often struggle to maintain employment while
juggling significant stressors such as inadequate housing, child care for
children with serious health problems, and transportation barriers. See HARD
LABOR 67 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White, eds., 1999). According to a recent
survey of low-income parents, "[nlearly half of the [respondents] reported that
they have experienced some kind of sanction, including terminations, lost
wages, denied promotions, and written and verbal warnings as a result of
trying to meet family needs." Id. at 1. Two-thirds of those surveyed had a
child with a chronic health condition or "special learning need." Id. See
KEEPING JOBS AND RAISING FAMILIES IN LOW-INCOME AMERICA: IT JUST

DOESN'T WORK 1 (Radcliffe Pub. Pol'y Center & 9 to 5 Nat'l Ass'n of Working
Women, 2002) available at http://www.radcliffe.edu/pubpol/boundaries.pdf.
See Michele Casey, et al., An Overview of TransportationIssues Affecting the
Welfare-to-Work Populations: The TRUC Program, CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
Jan./Feb. 2001, at 637 (finding that 58% of low-income workers living in the
Champaign-Urbana area missed work due to transportation problems).
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encumbered employees. 173 During recessions, low-wage jobs are
among the first eliminated because they typically involve the least
responsibility.1 7 1 If low-wage workers apply for UI benefits, their
applications are often denied for not having enough wages in their
7
' Low-wage workers are almost twice as likely to
"base period.""
become unemployed as all other workers combined, but fewer than
two in ten low-wage workers actually receive UI benefits.'76 Even
if they do receive unemployment benefits for six months, low-wage
workers typically have the most difficulty locating new
In short, so few low-wage workers choose to
employment.177
become unemployed to receive UI benefits that the UI system does
not have to rely on judicially-crafted barriers to reduce their
number artificially.
These worker disincentives stand in strong contrast to welldocumented employer practices designed to avoid the costs
associated with unemployment. Employers regularly misclassify
employees as independent contractors,'78 hire through temporary
173. As Harvey notes, employers' hiring standards increase along with the
supply of available labor. See Harvey, supra, note 23, at 709 n.112 ("At the top
of the business cycle and in geographic areas where aggregate demand [for
workers] is above average, employers find a larger portion of the labor force
'employable' as compared to other points in the business cycle and in
geographic areas where aggregate demand is less robust").
174. According to Harvey, "Even in periods of relative prosperity, low-wage
workers experience levels of unemployment normally associated with
recessions, while during recessions, their unemployment rises to depression
levels." Harvey, supra note 23, at 743. "From 1992 to 1995, low-wage workers
were twice as likely to be out of work as high-wage workers but only half as
likely to receive unemployment benefits." SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 13.
175. SAFETY NET, supra note 1, at 13. Low-wage workers are more likely to
qualify if they worked full-time for more than thirty-five weeks. Id. Because
using a dollar amount to qualify for benefits makes qualifying more arduous
for those earning lower salaries, the State of Washington measures monetary
eligibility according to the number of hours worked, but Michigan, New
Jersey, and Ohio count the number of weeks worked when determining
eligibility. Id. at 25 n.18.
176. See id. at 13 (noting that "[flrom 1992 to 1995... low-wage workers
made up about 50% of the unemployed former workers, even though they were
only about 30% of the total labor force"). Id. In March 1995, only about 18%
of unemployed low-wage workers were collecting UI benefits. Id. at 5.
177. See PrincipalStrategies,supra note 25, at 709. Harvey concludes that
for the past several decades in America "the great bulk of unemployment
actually experienced in the United States... has been proximately caused by
an insufficiency in the number of jobs available rather than by a structural
mismatch between job seekers and available jobs or by a refusal on the part of
unemployed persons to seek and accept available jobs." Id. See also Handler
& White, supra note 149, at 66 (finding that the market for low-skilled labor is
currently saturated with too few job openings to employ all of the low-wage job
seekers).
178. See Pandya, supra note 41, at 941 (citing a study showing that Illinois
employers did not report 13.6% of employees for the purpose of UI and of these
unreported workers, 49% were misclassified as "independent contractors").
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agencies,179 and pay employees in cash to avoid these costs.'80
Moreover, the U.S. system of experience-rated tax assessment,
where employer taxes are linked to unemployment receipt, gives
employers every incentive to fight unemployment claims.'
Research indicates that when employer taxes are not linked
to unemployment receipt, employers contest benefits seven times
less often.'82 Thus, the proper administrative review process
should include healthy skepticism of the employer's evidence given
the employer's clear self-interest in every unemployment claim."=
The concern to protect the public risk pool from those who are just
trying to escape work should be balanced with an equal concern
about employers who are trying to evade contributing their fair
share. After all, unemployment compensation protects workers
and employers alike against downturns in the market."
Ideally, IDES should consider how often employers contest
benefits and recognize that some employer strategies impede the
proper functioning of the UT system. But hearings referees often
do just the opposite, applying irrational levels of skepticism to the
employee's testimony, absolving the employer from the burden of
proving the statutory elements of misconduct, and refusing to
follow the actual language of the Act. In a recent administrative
hearing, a referee made the following comment:
M

I only deal with what occurred. If, for example somebody works
somewhere for 20 years, never had a problem, nicest guy in the
world, mowed the lawn on his lunch hour, painted the washroom on
his weekends off, best guy we ever had and one day he got in a fight
with somebody. That's all I deal with. That's 20 years of great
work, possibly ended because the person got in a fight with
somebody. So that's what I deal with. Not "Haven't I been... for
179. Id. at 910-11.
180. There is also evidence, although unverified, that employers manipulate
workers' schedules and earnings to render them ineligible. OBJECTIVES
JEOPARDIZED, supra note 1, at 5, 38-40. See Emsellem & Halas, supra note
56, at 306 (discussing the experience-rating system's incentive for employers
to file appeals).
181. See Emsellem & Halas, supra note 56, at 306-07 (pointing out that
employers' financial drive to contest unemployment claims has created an
industry of "third-party employer representatives" that now exists to
represent employers at unemployment hearings).
182. Id. at 305-06 (citing data from Advisory Council on Unemployment
Competition showing that when Puerto Rico used a flat tax, employer appeal
rates "were seven times lower than the national average").
183. See Mehta & Theodore, supra note 42, at 6 (citing Lambert & Legan,
1999, for the determination that a one-time layoff of 50 workers can increase
an employer's UI tax rate by 2%-3%).
184. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., A
DIALOGUE:
UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT
SERVICE

PROGRAMS (tech. supp. at 16) (showing that recessions occurring after the
creation of the UI system have been less severe, less frequent, and shorter),
availableat http://www.doleta.gov/dialogue (last visited Sep. 11, 2003).
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the last 20 years been the best guy you had," I say yes you have
been. But we can't have people fighting.' 85
The logic of this hearings referee exemplifies the agency's
failure to evaluate UI claims in light of the real economic
incentives driving employers to contest unemployment claims.
When an excellent employee is terminated after twenty years of
service, the referee should take notice. The employer's stated
reason for discharge is often a pretext for some other, possibly
illegal, reason for terminating the employee.'" A referee should
take the employer's account with a grain of salt, given the
legislature's stated policy to ease the crushing impact of
unemployment on the worker, his family, and society.187 Twenty
years of service reflects a superior work ethic, and such an
individual is probably a low risk for causing unemployment in
order to live shiftlessly on the government's nickel."'
Illinois courts that have refused to implement a legitimate
public policy decision by the legislature have obstructed the path
of social reform. The amendment of Section 602A was a victory for
grass-roots union and low-wage worker advocates who gathered
broad support for the reform. A decade later, it is clear that
legislative change is not enough because IDES and the courts are
determined to distort the statute through interpretation. 189 If the
185. This quote is taken from an administrative hearing held at IDES on
August 8, 2001, Docket # 1030234A. The Legal Assistance Foundation of
Metropolitan Chicago was successful in getting the hearing referee's decision
overturned in a subsequent administrative appeal to the Board of Review.
186. Of course a termination can be pretextual, although not illegal. "[S]ome
cases of replacement will be due to seniority rights, availability of more
efficient workers, or pure favoritism, and a careful examination of the facts
will be necessary in order to determine the real reason for the discharge."
Kempfer, supra note 52, at 161. Nevertheless, employees today enjoy legal
rights not recognized when the UI system was created and these rights must
be considered during the administrative review of unemployment claims.
Thus, in Lowe v. IDES (Ill. Cir. Ct., 01-L-50646 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2003)
(appeal pending). IDES probably erred in disqualifying a claimant janitor who
was "fired" for spitting outdoors one day after he complained about religious
harassment on the job.
187. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/100 (2000).
188. Even when an employer genuinely terminates an employee for cause,
low-wage workers are more likely to be fired for incidental rule violations than
are higher-paid workers whose occasional tardiness or absenteeism does not
materially affect the quality of their work. Thus, higher-paid workers often
have the double luxury of more official work benefits and more unofficial
tolerance of occasional malfeasance.
189. Political accountability usually serves as a corrective device when
courts exceed their judicial mandate to interpret laws as they are written by
the legislature. Judges elected to Illinois Circuit and Appellate Courts do not
want their names on poorly reasoned decisions that dilute or nullify legislative
reforms. However, the public can only hold courts accountable when court
decisions are available. As courts increasingly limit the number of decisions
they release for publication, a curtain falls over the judiciary, protecting
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Illinois judiciary's heightened scrutiny of workers deemed to have
committed misconduct signals a return to the entrenched
suspicion of jobless workers typical of the early twentieth century,
then this retraction of public support comes at a particularly poor
time. The American UI system balances a social welfare mission
of supporting the jobless with the social insurance goal of
protecting the economy against periods of recession by increasing
spending. The more courts turn ordinary firings into firings for
misconduct, the less the UI system can serve either of these basic
functions. The UI system performs optimally as an economic
stabilizer when 80% of the unemployed population receives 40%
wage replacement. 90 Throughout most of the United States, an
average of 37% of unemployed workers obtain 33% wage
replacement. Such low recipiency rates mean that, in times like
these, when the economy needs a boost in spending, the dollars
never make it into the hands of the workers who would spend
them for food, clothing, and shelter. The result for the entire
society is an extended recession. 9 ' Moreover, for some low-wage
workers, UT is now the only social welfare program available to
help them when they are out of work. In times past, traditional
welfare programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), provided a safety net for poor families when a
wage-earner became unemployed and did not qualify for
unemployment compensation.'9 However, in 1996 TANF replaced
AFDC."' TANF is a program of limited duration that focuses on
transitioning individuals off welfare and into low-wage jobs."
Thus, in this decade many of the lowest paid workers will not
qualify for any substantial economic assistance if they are
disqualified from the UT system. 9 ' At a time when the U system

judges who write poorly reasoned decisions and the courts that affirm them.
Of the last sixteen misconduct appeals that the Legal Assistance Foundation

of Metropolitan Chicago litigated on behalf of low-wage workers in Chicago,
the Illinois Appellate Court issued three published decisions; Scanlon and
Harvey were not among them. The Illinois Supreme Court is loath to review
appellate court decisions. The Supreme Court has not decided any misconduct
cases since Jackson, and therefore has not considered how misconduct defined
in Section 602A differs from the common law concept.
190. GUSTAFSON & LEVINE, supra note 14, at 4-6.
191. State legal restrictions enacted during the 1980s lowered recipiency
rates from those recorded during the recession of 1974-75. As a result,
unemployment benefits dropped by 20 billion dollars and, as many as 260,000
additional people entered poverty status. See OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED,
supra note 1, 43 (estimating that at the recipiency rate of 1974-75 period $70
billion would have been paid in 1990-91, rather than the $50 billion that was
actually paid).
192. GUSTAFSON & LEVINE, supra note 14, at 4-6.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Evidence is mounting that recent welfare leavers will not qualify for UI

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:27

should be expanding to support and encourage this welfare to
work philosophy, advocates cannot allow UI to erode.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The disqualification for misconduct is not fundamentally
inconsistent with either of the dual purposes of the UI systemsocial welfare and social insurance. However, in order for the
disqualification to further these goals, states need to reevaluate
the objectives of the disqualification.
Potentially, the
disqualification could serve at least three competing functions:
fraud prevention, employment stabilization, and risk allocation.
We have already seen two of these. Fraud prevention, a central
objective of the common law system described above, protects the
public risk pool from individuals who attempt to collect benefits
through the fraud of provoking their own termination.
Disqualification for misconduct also impacts the stability of
employment because it creates incentives that influence employers
and employee behavior. How misconduct is defined affects the
way employers treat employees at work, what behaviors they
tolerate, and what benefits they offer. Likewise, the definition of
misconduct communicates to employees behavior that is
acceptable in the workplace and creates a serious incentive for
workers to conform their behavior to minimally acceptable
standards, or face the threat of an extended period of
unemployment with no reliable income source."
In addition, the misconduct disqualification helps distribute
the risks, or costs, associated with unemployment between the
employer, the state, and the employee. By funding UI benefits
with employer taxes, states initially allocate the costs of
unemployment between the state and the employer - with the
under current laws. See generally VROMAN, supra note 20 (analyzing different
factors that make it difficult for welfare leavers to qualify for UI benefits). See
also GUSTAFSON & LEVINE, supra note 14, at 4-6.
196. Some commentators question whether this is an appropriate objective
for the UI system because the threat of benefit forfeiture contributes to
immobility in the labor force. Furthermore, the workplace standards are not
established by statute but rather are judicially imposed. Harrison writes that:
The effect of such examination [of whether a worker left a specific
position voluntarily or is involuntarily unemployed] is to transform the
state unemployment compensation laws into little labor relations acts
dealing with standards of conduct applicable to the worker in his
relation to his employer. The standards, with their strong emphasis
upon job immobility, are not only new and, it may fairly be said,
repugnant to American traditions; they do not represent rules of conduct
affirmatively established by any legislative body. Their enforcement
comes through negative sanctions in the form of a denial of benefits
from the system to which the worker who is out of a job, and ready and
able to take one, looks for aid.
Harrison, supra note 18, at 122.
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employer funding benefits and the state administering the UI
system.'97
However, workers also bear partial risk for
unemployment. Even claimants who collect benefits bear some of
the burden of unemployment because benefits replace only a
fraction of their lost wages. When workers do not qualify for
unemployment benefits under eligibility rules, they bear the entire
burden of unemployment.
In Illinois, claimants disqualified for misconduct also bear the
cost of unemployment alone because a finding of misconduct
prohibits them from collecting any benefits for the whole time they
are unemployed, rather than during some penalty period.
Nevertheless, employers typically view UI as an employer-funded
benefit that entitles the employer to a greater voice in policy
debates over UI benefit amount, duration, and funding issues.
States respond to pressure by redistributing the costs of
unemployment."
Expanding or contracting the definition of
misconduct is one way to reallocate burdens and benefits.
Another form of reallocation is to adjust the penalty attached
to a finding of misconduct. A third way is to alter the UI funding
scheme by modifying the contributions of the employee, the
employer, and the state. States commonly increase or decrease
employer taxes. However, states could also tax workers in order to
redistribute risk.2 °
How a state handles the disqualification for misconduct
directly affects how these competing functions (fraud, employment
stabilization, and risk allocation) are served. The Illinois cases
discussed throughout this article use an expansive definition of
misconduct that results in wide spread forfeiture of benefits.
These decisions put the risks associated with unemployment
disproportionately on the worker, create unproductive employer
incentives, and fail to affect employee behaviors because the
standards applied are arbitrary and not reflective of today's labor
market. On the other hand, an overly narrow definition of
misconduct, that disqualifies only a small number of discharged

197. The experience-rated method of funding is a key element driving
employers to stabilize employment by keeping workers on throughout
economic slowdowns.
198. Unfortunately, this lopsided funding has driven courts to interpret UI
statutes to require employer fault before workers can collect benefits. For
detailed analysis of this historic judicial trend see Simrell, supra note 42
(discussing the historical effect of experience rating).
199. See generally BALDWIN & MCHUGH, supra note 6 (providing a detailed
discussion on legislative changes made on a state-by-state basis to counteract

plummeting trust fund balances).
200. Although American workers do not pay UI taxes to the government
today, four states used to fund their UI systems in part with worker
contributions. Eveline M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and SocioEconomic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 4 n.12 (1945).
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claimants, might unfairly shift the burden of unemployment onto
the employers who already contribute substantial funds to the
system. A narrow definition could render the system more
vulnerable to fraud as benefits become more easily obtainable.
Such definition could also be inconsistent with government
interests due to the increased administrative costs resulting from
more individuals collecting benefits. Between these two extremes,
several states are currently using innovative ways to vary the
definition and penalty for misconduct.
A. DenialPeriods
In the majority of states, a finding of misconduct disqualifies
a claimant for the entire period of unemployment, until she
becomes reemployed for a specified number of weeks with earnings
sufficient to requalify. 0 1 For example, a claimant disqualified for
misconduct in Illinois must work at least four weeks and have
earnings in each of those weeks that equal or exceed his/her
weekly benefit amount to requalify.2 ' Ten states limit the period
during which benefits are denied for misconduct: after three weeks
to twenty-six weeks, claimants can begin receiving benefits. See
Figure ."03
Before 1980, denial periods were the most common penalty for
a finding of misconduct. Among states that used denial periods,
the primary justification was that, although workers who commit
a disqualifying act of misconduct are at fault for becoming
unemployed, when unemployment extends beyond the denial
period, it is no longer attributable to the worker's act of
misconduct, but rather to the market."4 For this reason, states
stepped in and paid benefits following the expiration of the denial
period.20 5 But states gradually moved away from denial periods, in
part to reduce costs, a trend that accelerated after the recessions
201. Thirty-eight states use durational disqualifications exclusively. Among
those states, the requalification period ranges from three weeks to fifty-two
weeks. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 443.101, 443.036 (West 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-706 (Supp. 2001). A few additional states use both durational and
denial periods. See Figure I, supra page 46.
202. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602 (2000).
203. Colorado and North Carolina use denial periods, not as a tempered
penalty for misconduct, but rather to penalize workers who commit lesser
offenses not rising to the level of misconduct. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108
(2001) (assigning a denial period of ten weeks to a list of employee infractions
that includes insubordination, rudeness, carelessness, wilful neglect, and
shoddy work); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (2002) (using a common-law definition
of misconduct and a statutory disqualification of "significant fault" which
results in a nine-week denial period that can be extended to thirteen weeks or
shortened to four weeks based on the presence of aggravating or mitigating

factors).
204. Kempfer, supra note 52, at 151.

205. Id.
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of the early 1980's and left several state unemployment trust
funds insolvent. 2 ' By 1993, forty-seven states had switched to
durational disqualifications .2
FIGURE I: Current List of Denial Period States
STATE
Alabama
Code of Ala. § 25-4-78
Alaska
Alaska Stat. § 23.20.379
Arkansas
A.C.A. § 11-10-514
Maryland
Md. Labor and
Employment Code Ann. §
8-1002 et seq.

STATUTORY
STANDARD
Misconduct

PENALTY

Misconduct

Denial period 3-7 wks
(according to severity)
Denial period 5 wks

Misconduct

Denial period 8 wks

Aggravated
misconduct
Gross misconduct

Durational

Misconduct

Denial perird 5-10 wks
(according to severity)
Denial period and possible
wage cancellation
Denial period 4-16 wks
(according to severity)
Durational
Denial period 7-10
(according to severity)
Durational
Denial period 5 wks

Durational

Missouri
§ 288.050 R.S. Mo.

Aggravated
misconduct
Misconduct

Nebraska
R.R.S. Neb. § 48-628

Gross misconduct
Misconduct

New Jersey
N.J. Stat. § 43:21-5

Gross misconduct;
Misconduct

South Carolina
S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35120
Vermont
21 V.S.A. § 1344

Discharge for cause

Denial period 5-26 wks
(according to severity)

Gross misconduct;
Misconduct

West Virginia
W. Va. 21-6-3

Gross misconduct;
Misconduct

Durational
Denial period 6-12 wks
(according to severity)
Durational
Denial period 6 wks.

Although not so designed, denial periods in the UI system
resemble comparative negligence theories of liability in
distributing risk between responsible parties according to their
fault. If the employer is 100% responsible for a job separation, a
straight lay-off situation, then the employee receives benefits
without penalty for the maximum number of weeks offered in that
state. However, if the employee is terminated for good cause or for
misconduct, situations where the employee is partially at fault,
then the employee shares the risk of unemployment with the
employer by waiting out a denial period during which she or he
receives no benefits. Four states fix the comparative liability of
both parties by setting the length of the denial period by statute."
206. BALDWIN & MCHUGH, supra note 6, at 9-10.
207. Id.
208. Although the application of comparative negligence to unemployment
disqualifications is an interesting theory for states to consider, this approach
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Six states make the comparative liability of the worker more
precise, by setting the range of the denial period in the statute and
directing the administrative agency to determine the actual length
of denial based on the severity of the worker's misconduct.
Denial periods further all three objectives of disqualifications.
Because a denial period still leaves a claimant with no income for
one to three months, it effectively deters fraud. However, unlike
durational disqualifications, denial periods do not dump all of the
costs of unemployment on the worker. Rather the costs are shared
among the worker, state, and employer.
B. Degrees of Misconduct and DenialPeriods
Seven states combine the use of penalty weeks with statutory
misconduct definitions graded according to severity. Maryland
provides the clearest example of this approach because it uses a
three-tiered system of misconduct.
Malicious behavior that
disregards the property, safety, or life of others, is defined as
"aggravated misconduct."21 ° Of lesser severity, "gross misconduct"
is conduct which, although not malicious, grossly disregards
employment rules and obligations.21'
The last tier, simple
"misconduct," is statutorily undefined but resembles "just cause"
in case law because it includes acts for which the worker is at
fault, but which are not intentional in nature.'
Simple

does take UI another step away from being a program geared primarily
toward providing for the social welfare of the unemployed, and employer fault
is irrelevant for that purpose. Simrell, supra note 42, at 198-99. In addition,
penalizing workers through denial of unemployment benefits can contribute to
labor immobility. Id.
209. Id.
210. Aggravated misconduct is defined as:
behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the
property, safety or life of others that:
(i) affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of
the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the
employer's product or services; and
(ii) consists of either physical assault or property loss or damage so
serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not
sufficient.
MD CODE ANN., Lab. & Empl. § 8-1002.1 (1999).
211. Gross misconduct is defined as, conduct of an employee that is:
(i) deliberate and wilful disregard of standards of behavior that an
employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference
to the interests of the employing unit; or
(ii) repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and
wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.
Id. § 8-1002.
212. See Bush v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 2084-BR-94 (finding that
claimant's continued lateness after warnings was misconduct even though it
was caused by needs of her mentally retarded child). But see Day v. Sinai
Hosp., 540 B.R. 85 (finding no misconduct where claimant's bizarre, loud and
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misconduct still does not include isolated instances of poor
performance or trivial infractions. 13
While Maryland created separate categories to correspond
with extreme acts of misconduct, other states use a traditional
common law definition of misconduct in conjunction with a lesser
standard, such as good cause or "significant fault," which carries a
lighter penalty.214 These state misconduct classifications vary
widely in their specificity, with some states leaving both degrees of
misconduct statutorily undefined.215 Lastly, several additional
states, including Illinois, single out specific acts such as
commission of a felony or violation of drug-free workplace policies
as a separate category of misconduct.216
The primary function served by designating categories of
misconduct is that states can assign them different penalties. The
most severe level of misconduct is met with durational
disqualification and/or a long requalification period. For example,
in Maryland, a claimant who commits aggravated misconduct
cannot re-qualify for benefits until she has earned at least thirty
times the weekly benefit amount in subsequent employment.217

aggressive behavior was a side effect of claimant's prescribed medication)
(copies of these decisions available at LAFMC).
213. See Proctor v. Atlas Pontiac, 144 B.R. 87 (holding that one mistake
made after only 31 days on the job was not misconduct). See also Forest v.
Tys, Inc., 452 B.R. 89 (finding misconduct does not include nondisruptive
expression of displeasure with working conditions) (copies of these decisions
available at LAFMC).
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (2002); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73108 (2001). While these two states use denial periods to penalize workers
under the lesser standard, some states use durational disqualifications for all
categories of misconduct but assign a shorter requalification period for lesser
acts of misconduct. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706 (Supp. 2001) (requiring
three weeks of reemployment to requalify after a finding of misconduct and
eight weeks after a finding of gross misconduct); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 224-15-1 (Michie 1997 & Lexis Supp. 2001) (stating that discharge for just cause
results in durational disqualification with requalification set at eight weeks;
all wage credits are cancelled for a finding of gross misconduct).
215. See D.C. CODE § 51-110 (Lexis 2001) (stating that example of
misconduct may be found in the regulations of the Unemployment
Compensation Board); see also 21 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1344 (2001) (noting that an
individual is disqualified if he was discharged for misconduct, without defining
misconduct).
216. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602 (2000) (stating miscondict includes
theft and conviction of a felony); ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (2000) (stating
misconduct includes sabotage, use of illegal drugs, endangering safety of
others and refusal to submit to drug testing); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-194 (1999)
(misconduct includes theft, embezzlement, assault or bodily injury); LA. REV.
STAT. § 23:1601 (West 2003) (stating misconduct includes misappropriation of
property and damage to reputation of the base employer); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 421.29 (2001) (misconduct includes assault, battery, theft, destruction of
property, use of illegal drugs and refusal to submit to drug testing).
217. See MD CODE ANN., Lab. & Empl. § 8-1002.1(c)(2) (1999) (describing
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Some states, such as New Jersey, also disregard the earnings from
a job from which the worker was terminated for gross misconduct
when calculating the base-period earnings required for a claimant
to re-qualify.218 For lesser categories of misconduct, penalties
usually take the form of denial periods and range from four to
sixteen weeks."' North Carolina even considers aggravating and
mitigating factors before assigning any penalty in the range of the
denial period provided for by statute."' Returning again to the
analogy of comparative negligence, the extreme penalties
correspond to situations in which the worker bears almost total
responsibility for the separation from employment; the penalties
reflect a more balanced allocation of blame.
States that use denial periods to treat acts of misconduct
according to severity avoid the arbitrariness seen in Illinois' onesize-fits-all standard, where a worker who assaults a co-worker
receives the same treatment as a working mother who misses
work due to child care problems. Denial periods distribute the
risks associated with unemployment more fairly because the
worker "pays" by losing benefits only when she is at fault, and may
eventually collect benefits when she does not commit an act of
gross misconduct. Of course, the ability of denial periods and
misconduct classifications to increase recipiency rates could be
undercut by courts or legislatures that demand a standard of
conduct that is unrealistic in today's labor market. The ability of
the disqualification to stabilize employment is contingent upon
realistic disqualification standards. Therefore, further research is
necessary to ensure that conservative states, such as Illinois,
would not simply use denial periods to deprive all unemployment
claimants of benefits for the first four to sixteen weeks.
Misconduct gradations are not the hallmark of workerfriendly misconduct jurisprudence.
States that combine a
traditional misconduct definition and durational disqualification
with a lesser category of just cause disqualifications and a denial
period may end up disqualifying more workers for more weeks
overall. A worker terminated for "shoddy work" faces a ten week
denial period in Colorado, while this worker would be immediately
eligible in Illinois where "shoddy work" has not been held to rise to
aggravated misconduct and grounds for disqualification).
218. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5 (West Supp. 2003).
219. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.050 (West Supp. 2003) (noting that for states
that distinguish among acts of misconduct according to severity, Missouri's
denial period represents both the high and the low figure ranging frhin four to

sixteen weeks).
220. In North Carolina, a finding of "significant fault" will result in a nine
week denial period, in the typical case. However, the Commission can
consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances and adjust the penalty in

accordance with the 4-13 week range provided in the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 96-14 (2002).
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the level of misconduct. 2 ' Likewise, states that choose not to
grade acts of misconduct according to severity do not necessarily
disadvantage workers.
The State of Washington uses a
misconduct definition strikingly similar to Illinois',22 ' but requires
employers to prove (a) actual detriment to their business
operations and (b) worker conduct that is intentional, grossly
negligent, or repeated after warnings. 23
Thus, the remedy for improving the Illinois misconduct
disqualification is not necessarily the creation of a new statutory
scheme of graduated misconduct definitions, each with its own
penalties. Like Washington, Illinois has a misconduct definition
that should serve to legitimately balance the three objectives of
disqualifications. While a liberal construction of the statute may
shift the burden of unemployment away from the worker and onto
employers and the state, this is a legitimate public policy choice
that is not unprecedented or inconsistent with the declaration of
public policy in the Illinois statute. The proper role for the Illinois
judiciary is to interpret that statute as written, consistent with
current labor conditions. If, under that natural interpretation of
the plain language of the statute, unemployment benefits prove
too costly, then the legislature can choose to redistribute the costs,
either by altering the misconduct definition, changing the
penalties, or shifting the funding. Illinois courts should not
reallocate these risks by misconstruing the language of the
statutory misconduct definition. In a representative democracy,
the legislature retains the power to choose among broad policy
options for reforming the UI system, and the courts should not
interfere with that process by misreading the language of the
statute.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article is not a critique of current advocacy efforts on
behalf of low-wage workers. Rather it seeks to point out some
troubling
developments
in
misconduct
disqualification
jurisprudence and make the case for including the disqualification
for misconduct more prominently in the national discussion of
ways to modernize the UI system. Clearly, if an unemployed
worker cannot even submit an application for unemployment
221. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108 (2001).
222. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293 (2002) (defining misconduct as "an
employee's act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or her employer's
interest where the effect of the employee's act or failure to act is to harm the
employer's business").
223. See Dermond v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 947 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1997);
Wilson v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 940 P.2d 269, 272 (1997) (applying the
misconduct test set out in Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 858 P.2d 494
(1993)).
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compensation because eligibility rules are complex, archaic, or
simply unrealistic, then low recipiency rates will continue to be a
major problem. But, antiquated eligibility rules have been on
everybody's minds in the last few years.
The General Accounting Office has issued several reports
evaluating the overall effectiveness of the UI system as well as its
availability for low-wage workers, and the recommendations of
these reports focus largely on eligibility issues. Early versions of
the federal economic stimulus package enacted in March 2002
would have extended benefits to part-time workers and utilized an
alternate base period for determining which workers met
monetary eligibility thresholds, so that more part-time, temporary,
and low-wage workers would qualify for benefits. Several states
have revamped their UI systems in the last few years to include
the recommendations of advocates and the General Accounting
Office. These states have adopted alternate base periods, and
specific provisions for victims of domestic violence and part-time
workers. In 1999, the Illinois House of Representatives convened
a special committee of the Labor and Commerce Committee to
examine problems within the state UI system and propose
solutions. The testimony centered predominately on improving
eligibility provisions.
Yet disqualifications are receiving relatively little attention in
the course of these programmatic reviews.
Even though
disqualification doctrines appear to suffer from many of the same
defects being identified by advocates with eligibility guidelines,
they still reflect the paradigm of the 1930's worker (full-time, longterm, with a non-working spouse) and unfairly penalize workers,
particularly low-wage workers who do not fit that paradigm.
Disqualification jurisprudence should allow workers benefits
when they are compelled to leave a job because of domestic
violence or family emergencies as well as when they are fired for
"misconduct" because balancing competing responsibilities makes
their work performance suffer. For this reason, the misconduct
disqualification deserves public attention during this historic time
of reevaluation of the unemployment system. In Illinois, the
statutory language of the misconduct statute still awaits a modern
interpretation and public debate may encourage courts to start
getting misconduct cases right.

